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Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining
Wesley MacNeil Oliver'
PLEA bargaining has been quite accurately described as "an informal,administrative, inquisitorial process of adjudication." 2 Those who brag
of the superiority of the American criminal justice system often praise its
adversarial, as opposed to inquisitorial, nature.' Yet for approximately ninety-
five percent of all defendants, the prosecutor is, for all practical purposes, the
only judge they will encounter.4 The prosecutor-judges who resolve these cases
do so without necessarily referring to how any other case was resolved and
do not follow any particular procedure, formal or informal, in deciding how
to make offers.s Their decisions are not subject to review and largely avoid
public scrutiny.6 Defense lawyers, in part for reasons of their own making, are
ill equipped for whatever idiosyncratic process a particular prosecutor's office
I Associate Professor of Law and Criminal Justice Program Director, Duquesne Law School.
B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale. I appreciate the very helpful comments of
Al Alschuler, Stephanos Bibas, Russ Covey, Frank Easterbrook, Jenny Roberts, Susan Klein, and
Ron Wright.
2 Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1399, 1404 (2003).
3 While championing the unique superiority of America's criminal justice system has long
provided an applause line in political speeches, opinions of the United States Supreme Court have
now similarly taken to touting its virtue. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)
(observing, with no small degree of contempt for European practice, that contrary to the "conti-
nental civil law," the "common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial
testing"); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 5Z,55 (1964) (boasting this country's "preference
for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice").
4 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2010) (describing statistics). For an historical
account of the transition of the American prosecutor from a relatively unimportant officeholder to
one with almost limitless power, see John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America:A Historical and Com-
parative Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 8-9 (John L. Worrall
& M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008).
5 See Stephanos Bibas, 7he Needfor ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv.
369, 373 (2010) (observing that prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a way that "is very often ad
hoc, hidden, and insulated from public scrutiny and criticism").
6 Id
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has developed for considering the defendant's perspective.' As one critic of
the American inquisitorial system has noted, our plea driven practice lacks the
attributes of the rule of law.'
There has been considerable disagreement in the legal community about the
impact the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye' and Lafler v.
Cooper" will have on this currently unregulated system of adjudicating criminal
cases.n In this Article, I argue that the long-term impact of these decisions
could cause judges and defense lawyers to reconsider their roles. These decisions
have the potential to address one of the most troublesome problems in the
criminal justice system-sentencing. From a macro-perspective, the problem is
inconsistent sentencing, but the problem from the individual's perspective is
that some defendants are receiving excessive sentences. Lafler and Frye have the
potential to address two of the causes of this phenomenon: underperforming
defense counsel and overzealous prosecutors. These decisions create the
potential for improving the performance of defense lawyers in negotiations and
may help inject criteria and transparency into the previously unregulated world
of prosecutorial discretion.
The opinions themselves broke new ground because they were the Supreme
Court's first recognition of the right to an effective plea bargainer and may
assume a place among the most important right-to-counsel decisions. There
has never been any doubt that the Constitution ensured the right of a defendant
to hire a lawyer for trial. With Gideon v. Wainwright,12 the Court recognized
that a defendant had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one,
7 To remedy this problem, Ron Wright and Ralph Peeples have suggested that defense law-
yers should now be evaluated by comparing the deals they cut compared to other lawyers in that
jurisdiction and that this information should be used to train defense lawyers. See Ronald F. Wright
& Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball:A Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1221 (2013).
8 See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargaining and the Decline
of the Rule of Law, (Nov. 20oS), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=854 284 .
9 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
so Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
n Luminaries in the area of criminal procedure have concluded that the decisions will have
little impact. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39
(June 12, 2o2), http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/o9 7.pdf; Craig M. Bradley, Effective Counselfor Plea Bargains, TRIAL, June 2012, at 56, 58 (specifically challenging commentators quoted in the
Times). Others conclude that these are groundbreaking decisions. See Stephanos Bibas, Taming
Negotiated justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 35 (June zo, 2012) ("Finally, the Supreme Court has
brought law to the shadowy plea-bargaining bazaar."), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/ro96.pdf; Cara H. Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense Litigation, 25 FED.
SENT'G. REP. 138,138 (2012) (suggesting that Lafter and Frye signal a retreat from formalistic reliance
on separation of powers that has thwarted the success of litigation seeking better compensation for
indigent defense).
12 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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and with Strickland v. Washington,' the Court held that the Constitution
entitled a defendant to effective representation. Until Lafer and Frye, however,
the Court had not recognized that a defendant could suffer prejudice from his
attorney's poor performance in the course of a negotiation.14 The absence of
any constitutional requirement that defense counsel effectively negotiate was
substantial, since the overwhelming percentage of convictions in this country
are obtained through a plea bargain-ninety-seven percent in federal court
and ninety-four percent in state court."s Statistically, the right to counsel is
the most critical in the negotiation phase. Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court
extended the right to counsel to indigents, who comprise the bulk of criminal
defendants.'" In Lafler and Frye, the Court extended the right to counsel to the
plea bargaining process, the phase of the trial that determines the outcome for
the bulk of criminal defendants. 7
13 Strickland v. Washington, 46 U.S. 668 (1984).
14 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 6o (1985), the Court found that a defendant who received
a thirty-five year sentence under a plea agreement could not show that he was prejudiced by his
counsel's incorrect description of his parole eligibility. Because the defendant had a prior felony, of
which neither the prosecution nor defense was aware, he was eligible for release after serving half of
his sentence, not one third as both the prosecution and defense assumed. Id. The Court concluded
that there had been no ineffective representation because the defendant would have been required
to serve half of whatever sentence he received at trial, not the third that lawyers for each side as-
sumed during their negotiations, and the defendant's sentence was discounted by the percentage he
believed when he entered into the plea. Id. He got the benefit he bargained for; his exposure was
simply higher than his attorney or the prosecutor assumed. Id. Of course, this lack of knowledge by
defense counsel could well have prejudiced the defendant. If the prosecutor was willing to accept
a sentence of thirty-five years with release eligibility after a third of that time, he may have been
willing to accept a shorter sentence if he had known the defendant was not eligible for release until
half the sentence was served.
The prejudice standard in Hill effectively precluded the claims the Court accepted in Lafler
and Frye. In Hill, the Court concluded that defense counsel's failure to be aware of his client's
actual release date for the crime to which he pled would be relevant only if this information would
have caused his client to reject the plea and go to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 6o. The Court's standard
said nothing about the possibility of this new information providing a basis for an argument in the
negotiation.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010), the Court recognized that a defense lawyer's
knowledge of a proposed plea bargain's immigration consequences is important because it informs
the negotiation strategy, something the Court did not consider as a possibility in Hill. As Justice
Stevens observed, a prosecutor may be amenable to a package that avoids deportation, something
defense counsel's failure to understand the deportation consequences prevented him from exploring
with the prosecuting attorney. Id.
15 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); see
Darryl K. Brown, The Decline ofDefense Counsel and the Rise ofAccuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93
CALIF. L. REv. 1585, 16o (2005) (observing the imperfect monitoring of prosecutors by the public,
particularly in cases that are not high profile).
16 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
17 Lafer, 132 S. Ct. at 1384; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405.
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The facts of Lafler and Frye were not complicated. In Frye, defense counsel
failed to communicate an offer to his client before it expired." In Lafler, defense
counsel incorrectly believed that a shot below the waist was insufficient to
demonstrate intent to kill and advised his client to reject a plea offer to the
crime of assault with the intent to kill.19 These cases were not about whether
the lawyers performed adequately during the negotiation phase. The state
authorities defending the convictions in Lafler and Frye did not claim that
either lawyer had behaved reasonably. Instead, the lawyers for the states of
Michigan and Missouri argued that there was no constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process.20 The Court
rejected their arguments, recognizing the central role plea bargaining plays in
the modern world.21 Quoting Dean Robert Scott and the late Professor William
Stuntz, the Court observed that "plea bargaining ... is not some adjunct to the
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."22
Prior to Lafter and Frye, the Supreme Court regarded plea offers to be
a matter of prosecutorial largesse, severely limiting defense counsel's Sixth
Amendment obligations in negotiations. Before these decisions, defense
counsel were found to be ineffective during plea negotiations only when they
recommended that their clients accept a plea even though there was a reasonable
probability that their client would have been acquitted on some or all of the
charges.23 While some lower courts had recognized that defense counsel had a
broader constitutional obligation to their clients during plea bargaining,2 4 the
Supreme Court's doctrines had placed no obligation on defense counsel during
the negotiation phase aside from evaluating the possibility of prevailing at trial.
Surely few convictions will be overturned because defense counsel was so
deficient that it failed to function as counsel during the negotiation process.25
But recognizing that counsel's role in the negotiation phase is as important
as it is in the trial phase may well change the ethos of defense lawyers and
18 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
19 Lafter, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
20 See Brief for the Petitioner at 12-23, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (No. zo-209),
2011 WL 1523284; Brief for the Petitioner at 15-32, Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (No.
10-444), 2011 WL 1593613.
21 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
22 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 01 YALE LJ. 1909,1912 (1992)).
23 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.52, 6o (1985).
24 See David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal? Remedying IneffectiveAssistance of Counsel During Plea
Bargaining, 120 YALE LJ. 1532, 1547-53 (2011).
25 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) permits a finding of ineffective assistance
of counsel only if counsel was "not performing as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Id A number of commentators have observed that few cases will be over-
turned because of the Lafler and Frye decisions. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas,Incompetent Plea Bargain-
ing andExtrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150,152 (2012); Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler:
No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39,42 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/io97.pdf.
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those who train them. Trial lawyers have long served as the role models for
great defense lawyers. Lawyers honing their skills to be like their idols have
sought to improve the skills that made their mentors famous-their persuasive
opening and closing arguments, their tight cross-examinations.26 Continuing
legal education courses for criminal lawyers have focused on trial and appellate
skills.2 7 Law schools have similarly reinforced the view that the most important
skills a criminal lawyer can possess are those used in the courtroom. Negotiation
courses have been taught at law schools for decades, but plea bargaining classes
are all but unknown.28
Lafler and Frye will be important in changing the internal and external
perceptions of criminal defense lawyers. It is significant that the Supreme Court,
rather than just a lower court, announced the right to an effective negotiator.
Law professors are reluctant to teach anything unless the Court has addressed
the issue, regardless of how important the issue may be to actual clients.29 Lafler
and Frye will make it difficult to continue to ignore plea bargaining in the law
school curriculum. Defense lawyers and those who train them will come to see
the need for studying plea bargaining techniques as equally important to the
need for practicing litigation skills for trials and appeals.
The visibility of these Supreme Court decisions puts them on defendants'
radar in a way that lower court's decisions could not. The decision of an
intermediate appellate court does not get the publicity of a Supreme Court
opinion. Lawyers will thus be more aware of these decisions, but so will their
former clients. This means that defendants in post-conviction proceedings,
who typically lack access to counsel, are thus much more likely to raise claims
for ineffective assistance of counsel in the negotiation phase in pro se filings.
Lafler and Frye may, however, have an even more profound effect, not because
ofwhat the Court did in these cases, but because ofwhat it did not do. While the
Court recognized there was a right to effective assistance in the plea bargaining
process, it did not identify the appropriate remedy for the violation.30 The Court
rejected as too rigid the two remedies used by lower courts finding ineffective
assistance in the plea bargaining process."1 These courts had either ordered new
trials or ordered prosecutors to re-offer the offers that were rejected on the
26 See discussion infra Part I.A.
27 See discussion infra Part I.B.
28 Bobbi McAdoo et al., It's Time to Get It Right: Problem-Solving in the First-Year Curricu-
lum, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y, 2012, at 39, 49 (noting dramatic increase in the number of negotia-
tion classes). Recently, the law schools at the University of Virginia and American University have
started teaching courses on negotiation. By contrast, most law schools in this country teach courses
on negotiation and/or alternative dispute resolution.
29 See discussion infra Part I.E.
30 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388-91 (2012) (remanding to determine appropriate rem-
edy); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012) (remanding to determine whether defendant
would have accepted plea and whether prosecutor would not have withdrawn it).
31 Lafjer, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-90.
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basis of bad advice. 32 Lafler and Frye established that lower courts were not
limited to these two options. The Court held that if constitutionally ineffective
counsel causes a plea to be rejected, the remedy, in the judge's discretion, lies
somewhere between the penalty offered in the rejected plea and the punishment
the defendant actually received.3 3 The Court specifically observed that in the
exercise of their equitable discretion, lower courts could find that defendants
rejected plea bargains on the basis of advice rising to the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and yet provide no remedy at all.4 To understand how
to exercise this vast discretion, lower courts seemingly must look to guidance
the Supreme Court has previously provided in ineffective assistance of counsel
cases. If their remedial powers are consistent with the limits on their ability to
sustain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally, then these courts
must now fashion remedies that ensure defendants receive the "fair" portion
of the plea offer they would have received were it not for their lawyers' errors.
In crafting this remedy, courts should look to the reasons prosecutors offer
plea bargains. Some pleas are driven by the prosecutor's sense that the outcome
achieves a just result, others are driven by the prosecutor's risk-aversion, efforts
to preserve judicial resources, or receipt of cooperation from the defendant.
Most are driven by some combination of those factors.3 1 In fashioning equitably
appropriate remedies for counsel's errors at the plea stage, courts seemingly
would have to consider the factors that would drive a reasonable prosecutor to
offer the deal that was lost to determine which portion of the plea represented
a "fair" outcome. As courts reason their way to providing remedies, they will be
speculating on the amount of consideration a reasonable prosecutor, in crafting
his offer, would give to various factors in the case. The reasoning of courts can
then provide a starting point for negotiations between prosecutors and defense
lawyers.
In the language of negotiation scholars, these decisions granting remedies
provide a standard of legitimacy-a respected source weighing in on how
prosecutorial discretion ought to be exercised. 6 Until Lafler and Frye, the
Supreme Court had recognized few constitutional duties of defense counsel
during plea negotiations." More significantly, prior to these opinions, separation
of powers considerations kept the judiciary from exercising any oversight over
prosecutorial charging or plea bargaining decisions." Lafler and Frye provide a
32 See Perez, supra note 24, at 1535.
33 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
34 Id.
35 See Albert W Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REV- 50,52-53
(x968).
36 See Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 281 (Michael
L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005).
37 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2050), had required a defense lawyer to apprise his
client of the immigration consequences of a plea bargain, but no other duties were recognized.
38 See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory ofProsecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Devel-
6 [ Vol. 102
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vehicle for courts to offer standards for the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial
discretion without intruding on the province of the executive branch.
The impact of these decisions is therefore potentially enormous. Scholars
have long called for judicial oversight of the prosecutorial discretion but their
calls for reform have been thwarted by courts'hard-wired respect for separation
of powers." By expanding the scope of defense counsel's Sixth Amendment
duty, and recognizing that courts have broad equitable powers to fashion
remedies, the Supreme Court has invited lower courts to indirectly develop a
set of best practices in plea bargaining negotiations.
This article considers the changes Lafler and Frye will mean for defense
lawyers, judges, and as a result, for prosecutors. While the greatest effects of
these decisions are likely to be indirect, the Supreme Court has potentially
caused a revolution in criminal procedure. Criminal defense lawyers will be
forced to think about negotiation in a systematic way, as civil lawyers have
done for decades. The decisions also provide judges fashioning remedies an
opportunity to define the appropriate uses of prosecutorial discretion.
I. DEFENSE LAWYERS
It may seem illogical to think that granting a remedy to defendants for
ineffective plea bargaining will cause defense lawyers to change. Defense lawyers
have, after all, been engaging in some form of plea bargaining for centuries.40 It
opment, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. I, 2-3 (2009) (arguing that while extraordinary power of prosecu-
tors is often explained in separation of powers terms, this is an historically inaccurate explanation).
39 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing ofProsecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871-73 (2009); Charles P Bubany & Frank F. Skillern,
Taming the Dragon:An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
473, 485, 493-94 (1976).
40 See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAININGS TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BAR-
GAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (describing plea bargaining in early nineteenth century Massachu-
setts); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE RooTs OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, I870-19to, at 177 (1981) (describing a rise in
rates of plea bargaining at the turn of twentieth century); MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L.
MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY I (2005) (describing the rise of
plea bargaining in New York City); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW &
Socy REV. 211 (1979) (arguing that pleas became the primary method of disposing of criminal cases
after the Civil War); Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure ofthe Criminal Process,
73 JUST. Sys.J. 338, 343-44 (1982) (describing an increase of guilty pleas from around fifty percent in
the 186os in New York, New Haven, and London to roughly ninety percent by i9oo).'Ihe common
wisdom is that plea bargaining was underground until the Supreme Court recognized its legitimacy
in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (5970). See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation ofPowers and
the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1045 (2oo6) (explaining that "plea bargaining existed as
an underground and unapproved practice for most of the nation's history"). It is not clear that the
practice was really underground. A year before Brady, a district court in West Virginia recognized
that "[p]lea bargaining, in the proper sense, is a commonly used tool in efficient administration of
justice, and its use in any case is not fatal per se." Raleigh v. Coiner, 302 F. Supp. 1H51, 1157 (D. W
Va. 1969). Further, a survey of judges in the 1950s concluded that sixty-six percent of the judges
2013-20141 7
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is certainly true that only since 1970 has the Supreme Court expressly regarded
guilty pleas as voluntary when they were entered into in exchange for leniency.41
As George Fisher has demonstrated, however, an underground system of plea
bargaining existed long before the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy
of trading trial rights for leniency in sentencing or a reduction of the charges. 42
Recent history is, of course, more instructive on this point. Ninety-four percent
of all state criminal cases and ninety-seven percent of all federal criminal cases
are resolved by guilty pleas. 43 Defense lawyers are thus quite accustomed to plea
bargaining.
Requiring defense lawyers to meet the less-than-demanding Strickland
standard, which requires only a minimal level of competence, while engaging
in the task they most often perform may not be expected to change practice.
Yet the uncomfortable role negotiation plays in a criminal defense lawyer's
self-description-and the lack of academic appreciation for the skill of plea
bargaining"-made an opinion announcing a remedy for ineffective negotiation
necessary to improve the quality of representation during the negotiation phase.
A. Defense Lawyers View Themselves as Courtroom Advocates,
Not Problem-Solving Negotiators
Lafler and Frye, unlike Strickland, will change the way defense lawyers
view themselves. Despite its prominence, defense lawyers rarely see their
primary job as a settlement negotiation, 45 nor do they frequently boast of their
negotiation skills. White-collar criminal defense lawyers often lament that
they have no opportunity to boast their greatest accomplishment-convincing
responding gave more lenient sentences to defendants who entered guilty pleas. Comment, The In-
fluence ofthe Defendants Plea on Judicial Determination ofSentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 2o6-o8 (1956).
41 See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered A Legal Pragmatists Guide to Loss,
Abandonment andAlienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2017 (2000) (observing that Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), "was the first of a landmark trilogy of Supreme Court cases enshrining
plea bargaining as a valid mode of criminal adjudication.").
42 FISHER, supra note 40.
43 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,1407 (2012).
44 See Thomas F. Liotti,Avoiding Prosecutions, 67 N.Y. ST. BJ., Feb. 1995, at 49,50 (observing
that while there is a "paucity of literature" on prosecutorial negotiations, it "may be explained
by the secretive nature of these matters, more to the point is the fact that since these backstage
machinations do not have the sexy glitz of trials, they are obscured.").
45 See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV- 563, 596 (1999)
("Many prosecutors, as well as defense lawyers, see themselves as 'trial lawyers.' Their role
satisfaction, standing among peers and effectiveness as negotiators can all turn on their ability to
believe and project their belief that they will win any case they try."). As one scholar on negotiation
has observed, "it may seem strange to apply general negotiation theory to plea bargains." Rishi
Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 309, 323 (20I3). Another scholar has observed that "[i]t may seem counterintuitive to link
negotiation theory and criminal procedure." Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to "Guilty": Plea
Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. IIS, 118 (1997).
8 [ Vol.102
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prosecutors not to seek indictments against their clients.46 There are few
vehicles for criminal lawyers to study the negotiating talents of great lawyers.
Civil lawyers obtaining large judgments are celebrated, regardless of whether
those judgments are negotiated or the result of a trial.47 Those identified as great
criminal defense lawyers are recognized for their performance in trial, or in the
rare case, on appeal. 48 Those great trial lawyers often are good negotiators but
their negotiation ability is rarely what brings them notoriety and certainly is
not the role the public envisions when it thinks of a preeminent criminal lawyer.
The public pictures Clarence Darrow examining a witness or addressing a jury,
not negotiating with a prosecutor.49
Regardless of their affinity for the task, negotiation is certainly not the work
law school trained criminal defense lawyers to do.s0 For many, there is something
that seems illegitimate about discussing possible settlement with prosecutors,
particularlywhen those settlements involve some type ofcooperation agreement.
Some high profile defense lawyers refuse to plea bargain at all, at least when
deals are contingent on cooperation.s" People questioned O.J. Simpson's choice
of Robert Shapiro, noting that Shapiro's primary experience was as a negotiator,
46 See Liotti, supra note 44, at 49 (observing that "prosecution avoiders ... are not necessarily
famous" and "function quietly behind the scenes").
47 For instance, the Million Dollar Advocates Forum and Multi-Million Dollar Advocates
Forum limit membership to lawyers who have obtained million (or multi-million) dollar judg-
ments for their clients, but they do not differentiate between settlements and verdict. The Top Trial
Lawyers in America, MILLION DOLLAR ADVOCATES FORUM, http://www.milliondollaradvocates.
com (last visited Oct. z6, 203).
48 Alan Dershowitz seems to be one of the few lawyers who gained a popular reputation as
a criminal lawyer from his appellate work. This was largely a result of his work on the Claus Von
Bulow case, which became the subject of one of Dershowitz's books and was made into a popular
movie. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITz, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INSIDE THE VON BoLOW CASE (1986).
49 A number of biographies have been written about Darrow. See, e.g., JOHN A. FARRELL,
CLARENCE DARROW: ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (2011); ANDREw E. KERSTEN, CLARENCE
DARROw: AMERICAN ICONOCLAST (20II); IRVING STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR THE DEFENSE:
A BIOGRAPHY (194); KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY (1979); ARTHUR & LILA WEIN-
BERG, CLARENCE DARROW: A SENTIMENTAL REBEL (1980). None of these biographies describe
Darrow's plea bargaining practice.
50 See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator:A Systemic Ap-
proach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 74 (1995) (asking why criminal defense lawyers do not bargain ef-
fectively despite the frequency with which defense lawyers bargain). In research interviews, de-
fense lawyers nevertheless report that they approve of the process of plea bargaining. See MILTON
HEUMANN, ADAPTING To PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 157-62 (1978). The public at large has a very different view of the legitimacy
of the practice. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions ofFairness and justice: The Shared
Aims and Occasional Conflicts ofLegitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 2I,
237-39 & nn.i14-15 (2012) (citing survey research). While actors in the system may regard plea bar-
gaining as legitimate, it is clear that defense lawyers regard it is as a less legitimate, or prestigious,
way to practice law, as the defense bar has engaged in a less concerted effort to study and improve
its skills in this area than it has with other skills defense lawyers employ.
51 See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 118-19 (1995)-
9
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
not as a trial lawyer.s2 The obvious inference was that one's skills at negotiating
high-profile cases were nQt as impressive as trying cases, or that negotiating
such cases did not demonstrate competence at presenting these issues in court.
Given the strong case the State of California had against O.J. Simpson, a lawyer
with a reputation as a good negotiator should have seemed like an excellent
choice."
There is also an economic explanation for the reluctance of criminal lawyers
to see themselves primarily as negotiators. Transactional costs play a more
substantial role in evaluating the effectiveness of a civil lawyer than a criminal
lawyer. In a civil case, a rational litigant is indifferent to paying $100,000 in
litigation costs as opposed to $100,000 in a settlement.54 In a criminal case,
there is no such equivalence. Typically the only victory to be achieved in
negotiation is the avoidance of more jail time. Clients rarely consider the cost of
litigating a trial in deciding whether to accept a plea offer. Clients with money
to pay counsel would pay virtually any legal fee imaginable to avoid jail time.
But, of course, many defendants are indigent, and those that aren't generally
pay flat fees.
A criminal defense lawyer who recommends his client accept a plea is
thus typically making a recommendation that advances the lawyer's financial
interests. The retained attorney is most often receiving a flat feess for less work
and the public defender whose client accepts a plea is able to move to other
cases, or perhaps get a weekend off. This potential conflict between the lawyer's
interest in a plea and the value to the client of a plea is often referred to as an
agency cost-the lawyer's role leads him or her to have interests opposed to
those of his client.5 6
Maximizing a client's wealth-or minimizing his losses-is the goal of a
civil lawyer, and the value of his work is judged in monetary terms. Negotiating
is thus more central to the civil lawyer's role of maximizing his client's wealth,
52 See MICK BROWN, TEARING DOWN THE WALL OF SOUND: THE RISE AND FALL OF PHIL
SPECTOR 406 (2007) ("Shapiro enjoyed a formidable reputation for smoothness and charm; he was
a man who, according to [a] Los Angeles lawyer 'couldn't find his way out of a box'in trial but was
widely regarded as a peerless negotiator and fixer.").
53 See, e.g., Editorial, Unreasonable Doubt. O.J. Simpson Acquittal, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23,
1995, available at http://business.highbeam.com/4 7 76/article-iG'-I 76i88 9 /unreasonable-doubt
(describing the strength of the prosecution's case).
54 Of course, economists and psychologists describe bounded rationality, which leads litigants
to reject settlement offers that are in their economic interests. See Michael J. Kaufman, Summary
Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court's Profound, Pervasive, and Problematic Presumption about Human
Behavior, 43 Loy. U. CHI. L.J 593, 615 (2012) (observing that litigants will reject offers that they
believe to be unfair even when they should-rationally-accept the offers).
55 Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV- 595, 6oo (1993)
(observing that "virtually everyone advises criminal defense lawyers to get their whole fee up front,
either as a flat fee for the entire representation or in the form of a retainer against which their
hourly rate will be offset.").
56 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, sos YALE LJ. 1979, 1987 (describing
agency costs in criminal representation).
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as a negotiated settlement consumes less of the client's wealth than a trial."7 The
financial costs of trial are very much a part of the 4alculation for civil litigants,
while the odds of beating the prosecution's offer alone typically determine
a criminal defendant's decision to go to trial or accept the offer. A public
defender, or retained counsel receiving a flat fee, may shy away from embracing
negotiation as her essential function because settling cases in this manner
highlight one of the tensions in her representation. A settlement is typically
more economically efficient for the criminal defense lawyer than trying the
case."'Ihe tension is less often obvious for civil lawyers, as most criminal defense
lawyers do not bill hours. Lawyers billing hours-and to a lesser extent civil
lawyers on contingency fees-have a stake in taking a case to trial if a better
result is possible. 9 When a civil lawyer, who bills by the hour, advises a client
to settle, such advice is contrary to her pecuniary interests so it does not raise
the same sort of conflict of interest that could result from a typical criminal
lawyer's advice to take a plea. Despite popular culture's depiction of criminal
defense lawyers, most regard their duties to their clients as sacred obligations
and not just a means of making a comfortable living (in fact, a good percentage
of criminal defense lawyers do not live that comfortably). It may be difficult for
well-intentioned defense lawyers to see their primary job description as one
that highlights a tension between the lawyer's economic interest and the client's
liberty interest.o
B. Training Reinforces the Courtroom Advocate Model of Defense Lawyers
Law schools train students for litigation.The majority of courses use the case
method, teaching students to view the world through the lens of litigation-
appellate litigation to be precise. While law schools typically boast that they are
training students to think like lawyers, they are primarily training students for
57 It is frequently assumed that there is a tension between a lawyer receiving a contingency fee
and his client as the amount of work that would produce the optimal outcome for the client would
not necessarily produce the optimal outcome per hour worked for the lawyer. See e.g., Bruce L. Hay,
Contingency Fees andAgency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996).
58 See Schulhofer, supra note 56, at 1988 (observing the financial incentives of public defenders
and court-appointed counsel to plead cases).
59 Contingency fees in criminal cases obviously do not raise the same sorts of concerns as
contingency fees in civil cases. In a civil case, a lawyer working on a contingency fee who only col-
lects if there is a judgment in the plaintiffs favor may have a financial motive in settling too early,
and may not fight hard enough for the client. In a criminal case, a contingency fee paid to a lawyer
only when he obtained an acquittal would lead a lawyer to be hesitant to settle. Given the infre-
quency of acquittals, few lawyers would be willing to accept such a contingency fee in a criminal
case. Most state ethics rules forbid contingency fees in criminal cases. For an excellent argument
challenging this rule, see Peter Lushing, The FallandRise ofthe Criminal Contingent Fee, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1991).
60 David Abrams has suggested that defense counsel's institutional interest in maintaining a
working relationship with a prosecutor may create pressure for settlement. David Abrams, Is Plead-
ing Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 200, 220 (20I).
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only one aspect of lawyering: courtroom advocacy. Quite naturally, graduating
law students going into litigation view their most important skill sets to be
those used in a courtroom. The criminal bar organizations, which generally do
an excellent job in both skills training and updating their members in statutory
and case law developments, have not remedied this inaccurate self-perception.
In fact, they have reinforced the adversarial model of the legal profession.
Plea bargaining is not a part of the training for defense lawyers, neither
in law schools nor as part of continuing legal education courses conducted by
defense lawyer organizations.6' National, state, and local organizations provide
seminars covering every aspect of strategy in conducting trials and pre-trial
hearings.62 Members of these organizations publish manuals and treatises
such as Cross Examination: Science and Techniques" and Pretrial Motions in
Criminal Prosecutions.64 Last year's annual meeting of the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers illustrates the point. Courses were offered, for
instance, on voir dire, opening and closing statements, suppressing illegally
obtained evidence, and appellate advocacy.65 Not one course was offered on
negotiating with prosecutors. By contrast, civil lawyers frequently study the art
of negotiation.6 1
Law schools are part of this problem as well. Take a look at any major
law school's curriculum. All have courses on the definition of crimes and the
admissibility of the fruits of police searches and interrogations. Many have
courses on the rules and procedures governing the pre-trial, trial, and post-
conviction process. Classes dealing with how either prosecutors or defense
lawyers should approach plea bargaining are remarkably absent from virtually
61 See Uphoff, supra note 50, at 75 ("[L]ittle attention has been paid to the application of gen-
eral negotiation principles to the plea bargaining of criminal cases.").
62 For a sampling of these courses, see the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yer's website. LegalEducation, NATL AssN OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERs, http://www.nacdl.org/meet-
ings/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2053).
63 LARRY S. POZNER & ROGER J. DODD, CRoss EXAMINATION: SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUES
(2d ed. 2004).
64 JAMES A. ADAMS & DANIEL D. BLINKA, PRETRIAL MOTIONS IN CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TIONS (2d ed. 1998).
65 NATL Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 62. Similar course offerings are, in my
experience, quite standard at all levels of defense organizations.
66 A number of continuing legal education programs are conducted for those engaged in
civil negotiations. See e.g., Susan M. Chesler, An Introduction to Negotiation for Future Transaction
Lawyers, Bus. LAW. TODAY (Apr. 2o1), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2on1/04/
training-for-tomorrow.pdf (describing class on contract drafting that incorporates negotiations);
LEGAL PRO NEGOTIATOR, http://egalpronegotiator.com/#sthash.cF 9 vRwh.dpbs (last visited Oct.
26, 2013) (offering online instruction on negotiating); Negotiation Skills for Lawyers, BRITISH LE-
GAL CENTRE, http://british-legal-centre.com/en/Negotiationskils-workshop.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2013) (describing course as appropriate for lawyers and businesspeople); Program on Nego-
tiation, HARv. L. SCH., http://www.pon.harvard.edu/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (offering multiple
versions of negotiation courses); Programs, NATL INST. FOR TRIAL ADvoc., http://www.nita.org/
Shop#programs (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (describing one and two day programs).
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all law school curricula. 'Ihis absence is glaring given the prevalence of plea-
bargaining and the very different types of arguments made in those settings.
Traditional criminal law courses do not cover the considerations about the
appropriateness of bringing a charge, the possibility of cooperation and how
it should be valued, or how to consider equities not contemplated by statutes.
All of these considerations play more prominently in most plea negotiations
than the principles of statutory interpretation, or the admissibility of evidence,
taught in traditional criminal law and procedure classes.
The standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington was not necessary to
motivate lawyers to dedicate themselves to their clients at trial.'Ihis is the role
they've trained for and the task they view themselves as performing. Law school
trained them to view themselves as courtroom advocates and professional
societies reinforced this self-image. Stricklands requirement that defense
lawyers be minimally competent at presenting cases in a courtroom naturally
did little to change the quality of representation for defendants.6 1
C. The Effect of Sanctions
The threatened sanction for, or shame of, being identified as an ineffective
lawyer in Lafler and Frye may be necessary to reorient the perspective of defense
counsel and those who train them.68 Very few lawyers will be found to be
ineffective for applying the level of care they currently employ in negotiating
criminal cases. 69 But the Supreme Court's recognition that the same type of
scrutiny that applies to a lawyer's negotiation also applies to his work in trial
67 In fact, in Strickland, the Court observed that the Sixth Amendment's purpose was "not to
improve the quality of legal representation...." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
68 See Batra, supra note 45, at 310 (contending that the Supreme Court "has effectively created
a negotiation competency bar for criminal defense attorneys"). Contrary to what some ill-informed
critics of criminal defense lawyers may say, these attorneys do not with any frequency intentionally
render ineffective assistance to their clients and do want to avoid the stigma of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, The Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution: Two Florida
Case Studies, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 71 n.50 (2005) (observing that lawyers in a post-conviction
proceeding were clearly attempting to avoid the stigma of having rendered ineffective assistance).
State ethical rules recognize defense counsel's interest in avoiding such stigma and permit defense
counsel to divulge information otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege, even though the
defendant is not seeking damages but merely relief from a bad plea-bargain. For an excellent criti-
cism of these rules, seeJenna C. Newmark, The Lawyer's "Prisoner's Dilemma": Duty and Self-Defense
in Postconviction Ineffectiveness Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 699 (2010).
69 See Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, supra note 25, at 161-3.
'There will, however, be a fair number of these cases; decisions on the merits of the attorney's per-
formance will be necessary. Unlike a claim of ineffective assistance at trial or on appeal, a claim of
ineffectiveness at the plea bargaining stage necessarily involves prejudice. See discussion supra Part
1. B. The most likely mechanism for screening these cases seems to be the requirement that a court
finds that a defendant would have accepted the plea offer.The Court granted cert in Burt v. Titlow,
a case raising the question of whether a defendant's assertion that he would have accepted the plea




may go a long way in changing the defense bars' view of plea bargaining. The
Court announced that the work a defense lawyer does in negotiating is every bit
as important-every bit as much a part of his Sixth Amendment obligation to
his client-as vigorously challenging the prosecution's case in open court." As
the ethos of criminal defense lawyers changes and they openly recognize that
a form of alternative dispute resolution is a legitimate use of their skills, they
will seek to improve their ability to perform this task. Programs on negotiating
with prosecutors may become as common as programs on trial advocacy. The
Court's recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky held that a defense lawyer is not
acting competently if he fails to learn of his client's potential for deportation
before entering a guilty plea, and this awakened the defense bar to the need
to understand immigration law.' Just as continuing legal education (CLE)
programs began to change after Padilla, Lafler and Frye may lead to CLE
events on negotiation tactics and certainly on the basic duties of lawyers in
negotiations.
D. The Defense Bar and the Effects of Information Sharing
Clients represented by all criminal defense lawyers, whether highly
compensated private lawyers or public defenders,n will benefit from this
change in self-perception. The criminal defense bar in most places is a very
tight-knit group that frequently convenes to discuss new cases, legislation,
rules, and even skills and strategies. As criminal defense practices tend to be
small, there is often less of a hierarchical structure in the criminal defense bar
than among lawyers who primarily engage in other practices. Senior criminal
lawyers routinely mentor and share information and experience with junior
70 See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384-85 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-lo
(2012).
71 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). See, e.g., Defending the Modern Drug Case:
Program Agenda, NATL Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAws., http://www.nacdl.org/LegalEducation.
aspx?id=i96oi (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).
72 The institutional training provided by defense lawyer organizations is invaluable and ex-
plains why public defender offices are able to perform as well as they do with their overwhelming
case loads. Public defender offices, in no small part because they are typically the largest offices
practicing criminal defense in any given city, have the best in-house institutional training. Despite
ill-informed discussions, mostly by non-lawyers, about the quality of public defenders, public de-
fenders tend to be among the most talented lawyers representing criminal defendants. See Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21, Century, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1995, at 81 (describing the author's own experience as a public defender). Small firms and
solo practitioners are more frequently cited than others for ethical violations. See Hal R. Lieberman,
How to Avoid Common Ethics Problems, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at S4 . No doubt this is related to the
lack of shared experiences and institutional training in such offices. Within public defender offices
there is great institutional knowledge and training, and within the defense bar generally there is a
lot of shared knowledge and instruction.
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lawyers. By formal and informal methods, information, tactics, and even war
stories (perhaps especially war stories) travel very quickly through this relatively
egalitarian group with a strong sense of shared interest.
If the members of the defense bar begin to view negotiation skills as
important, as worthy of study and honing as trial skills, then defense lawyers
will learn from each other how to better present their cases to the prosecutor-
judges who most often determine their clients' fates. The capital defense bar
provides a solid analogy. Many believe that a concerted effort by the defense bar
to understand how best to defend capital cases has contributed to the decline
in death sentences.13 As Jeffrey Toobin described in a recent New Yorker article,
capital defense lawyers, with the help of anthropologists and ex-journalists,
began in the mid-1980s to learn how to tell mitigation stories about defendants
in a way that did not offend juries.74 The sentencing phase of a capital case
provided lawyers an opportunity to "tell the life story of the defendant in a
way that explained the conduct that brought him into court."" Today, those
techniques are an essential part of building an effective capital defense case."
Many believe these efforts were prompted by a string of Supreme Court
decisions holding that a defense lawyer rendered ineffective assistance if he put
on an inadequate mitigation.7
Some may argue that such an effort by the defense bar would not similarly
assist attorneys in plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is certainly idiosyncratic
because each prosecutor is unique and may employ any tactic he chooses in
the discussion. But juries are similarly unique, and the defense bar has found
it enormously helpfiul to train members of its profession in trial methods that
have proven successful, and not just in capital cases." Many criminal defense
lawyers swear by the training they receive from organizations like the National
Criminal Defense College, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and various local organizations to improve their abilities."
In the context of plea bargaining, it is not just skills that defense lawyers
could acquire from sharing information and institutional training by various bar
organizations. Once these groups begin to publicly acknowledge the value of
being an effective negotiator, they will likely begin to share information about
73 See Quintin Chatman, Death Penalty Roundtable, CHAMPION,July zoo8, at 14,15 (describing
improved results from better training).
74 Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2011, at 32, 32-34.
75 Id. at 34.
76 See Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic ofCapital
Mitigation, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV. 835, 876 (2008).
77 Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & Pus. PoLY 337,339 (2009).
78 See Quintin Chatman, The War Against Capital Punishment, CHAMPION, June 20i0, at 18
("[P]articipants in [NACDL] seminar[s] regularly report of successful outcomes in their capital




deals offered by various prosecutors." One might suspect that defense lawyers
would be competitive and riot disclose the tactics that lead to the special deals
they believe themselves uniquely able to acquire.This may be true in some cases,
but the culture of criminal defense lawyers is typically quite collaborative."
Defense lawyers generally have no qualms about teaching others the trial tactics
that have made them successful.82
As Lafier and Frye encourage defense lawyers to embrace their skills as
negotiators, metrics can be developed to study the effectiveness of various
lawyers so that their tactics can be replicated. Ronald Wright and Ralph
Peeples have suggested that the value a particular lawyer brings to a case can be
considered by looking at how the results she obtains compare to results other
lawyers obtain in similar cases." Wright and Peeples suggest that this sort of
data would be valuable to organizations like public defender offices in evaluating
and training lawyers.84 As Lafler and Frye make lawyers more comfortable with
their value being measured by the results they obtain in negotiations, such data
collection for training purposes is likely to become more prevalent. Data sets
would provide not only insight on training skills, but the data itself will also
provide a baseline for typical offers, thus constraining prosecutors who want to
deviate from the norm.8 5
E. The Effect on Law Schools
It is not only the defense bar that is to blame for ignoring the importance of
plea bargaining. Law schools have done virtually nothing to teach students how
to engage in this vital role. My own story reflects the type of practice for which
law school equips students. In my first month as a criminal defense lawyer in a
small firm, I had a preliminary hearing in a drug case (which led to a suppression
motion), three arguments in an intermediate state appellate court, an argument
in a federal appeals court, and countless negotiations with prosecutors. Law
school had prepared me quite well to develop the Fourth Amendment issues
8o See Batra, supra note 45, at 332-33-
81 See Susan Bandes, Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 339,
387 (2006) (describing the generally supportive culture of criminal defense lawyers).
82 See Mary S. Backus & Paul Marcus, The Rightto Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis,
57 HASTINGs LJ. 103, 1095 (2oo6) (describing training provided by the National Criminal Defense
College but noting that few public defenders have funding to attend).
83 See Wright & Peeples, supra note 7, at 1236.
84 Id. at 1223.
85 Susan Klein has suggested that prosecutorial discretion could be constrained by requiring
prosecutors to disclose the sort of deals that are standard for the crime charged. Susan R. Klein,
Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2028
(2006) ("To ensure accuracy and equality, federal criminal defendants and jurists need the informa-
tion necessary to determine whether a prosecutor could prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a
jury, and the data regarding charges imposed and sentences levied against suspects alleged to have
engaged in similar conduct.").
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in a suppression motion and had trained me extraordinarily well to handle the
appeals. Virtually every class approximated responding to an appellate judge's
questions, and my first year writing class and second year moot court simulated
appellate panels.86 Nothing, however, prepared me for the prosecutor's offer that
my client plead to a misdemeanor drug offense and serve eleven months and
twenty-nine days, day for day, at thirty percent for an offense charged as a B
felony." Tennessee's sentencing structure is confusing and law school (certainly
one in a different state) could not have prepared me to understand it. It would
have been a waste of the limited time in law school to learn the sentencing
structure of all the neighboring states. But I was unsure of what I should have
learned going into this meeting, whether this was a good offer, or what sort of
information I should offer to try to improve it. I had no idea how to go about
this very informal discussion that had enormous consequences for my client.
By contrast, law schools have long been educating students and practicing
lawyers on how to approach civil negotiations, though these classes have
surely been under-appreciated." Most law students graduate without taking
a class in negotiation. Nevertheless, a vast amount of research in psychology,
economics, and game theory has informed academic research on negotiations,
which has greatly enhanced training in negotiation.' 9 Thus far, however, no one
has attempted to adapt the extraordinary amount of work done to understand
and teach the skill of negotiation to the unique circumstances of criminal
negotiations.90
86 Josh Bowers described a very similar disconnect between his legal training and experience
in a white-collar boutique firm and his subsequent experience in dealing with cases as a public
defender in the Bronx. SeeJosh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, II34
(2013).
87 Certainly the intricacies of Tennessee sentencing law are all but impenetrable, even to
those involved in the system daily. See Mark Bell, No Standard Jail Sentence Calculations at County
Levelin Tennessee, NAT'L SHERIFFS'Ass'N INsT. FOE JAIL OPERATIONS (Nov. 19, 2o), http://www.
jailtraining.org/node/715.
88 See McAdoo, supra note 28, at 49.
89 See, e.g.,J. KEITH MURNINGHAN, BARGAINING GAMES: A NEw APPROACH TO STRATEGIC
THINKING IN NEGOTIATIONS 12-13 (1993) (applying game theory to negotiation situations); Robert
J. Condlin, Legal Bargaining 7heory's New "Prospecting" Agenda: It May Be Social Science, but Is It
News?, s0 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 215, 220 n.30 (20o) (observing that "U]ournals in social psychol-
ogy, economics, organization theory, and related fields published articles on bargaining long before
law journals, of course, but little of this work made its way into legal bargaining scholarship"); Re-
becca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 95 MARQ,
L. REV. 163, 182 (2007) ("the rich literature on biases and heuristics is a tremendous resource for
those studying negotiation between a prosecutor and a defense attorney"); Deepak Malhotra &
Max H. Bazerman, Psychological Influence in Negotiation:An Introduction Long Overdue, 34 J. MGMT.
509 (2008).
90 One excellent example of a program of instruction on negotiation for law students and
practicing lawyers alike is the Harvard Program on Negotiation. Program on Negotiation, HARV.
L. ScH., http://www.pon.harvard.edu/ (last visited Oct. 26, 203). This program features practical
instruction that uses the lessons learned from all of these disciplines. Their instruction focuses on
Robert Mnookin's the groundbreaking work on a collaborative approach to negotiation whereby
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Lafler and Frye should send a signal to law schools that if they are going
to teach their students to function as competent counsel, they should at least
provide them an introduction to plea bargaining. 'ie Supreme Court has had
more influence in developing criminal procedure curricula than it has any other
topic. A look at virtually any criminal procedure casebook will illustrate this
point. With one exception, these books almost exclusively contain cases from
the Court. And the exception proves the rule.The early editions of Ron Wright
and Marc Miller's excellent casebook on criminal procedure primarily contained
state cases, though those cases incorporated federal cases in their analyses.9 The
later editions responded to concerns from law teachers who wanted landmark
Supreme Court cases on criminal procedure in the book.92 Once Lafler and Frye
are included in casebooks, these important Supreme Court cases will at least
prompt law professors to introduce students to the fact that they are responsible
for being effective at the plea bargaining stage of the process, just as they are at
the trial and appellate phases.
Unfortunately, teaching the Court's criminal procedure doctrines has not
yet led to an increase in the skills associated with those doctrines. A number of
Supreme Court cases have found lawyers ineffective for failure to investigate,
yet with few exceptions law schools do not teach students how to investigate. 93
The law schools that teach Strickland typically do so in a second semester
criminal procedure course, but only the legal standard is taught-not how to go
about, or supervise, an investigation. This omission is particularly glaring given
that Northwestern journalism students, not law students, discovered the facts
revealing the cases of innocence on Illinois' death row.94 Law schools, however,
parties can find value making them each better off. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET
& ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DISPUTES 42-43 (2ooo) (observing that every negotiation has value-creating and value-distribut-
ing opportunities). This model does not work well to explain how one ought to approach a criminal
negotiation in which a prosecutor can virtually always seek more stringent penalties and whose
only restraint is typically internally imposed. Not surprisingly, as so little attention has been given
to developing the skills involved in plea bargaining, there has been no paradigm-shifting approach
to criminal negotiations that Mnookin brought to civil negotiations.
91 See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES-PROSECUTION
AND ADJUDICATION (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., ist ed. 1999).
92 See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,
AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
93 See e.g., Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and
the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77, l04 (2007) (contending that the
Supreme Court has imposed increasing duties on counsel to investigate). I am aware of only two
courses taught on factual investigation at law schools in this country, one is at Rutgers taught by a
member of the tenured faculty and the other is taught by an adjunct at the University of Arizona.
94 See Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?:
International Norms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk ofExecuting the Innocent, 2001 WIsc.
L. REV. I, 7 (2001); Locke E. Bowman, Lemonade Out of Lemons: Can Wrongful Convictions Lead
to Criminaljustice Reform?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I50, 1504 (2oo8) (reviewing JON B.
GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING
THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM (2007)).
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are coming under increasing pressure to teach the skills lawyers will actually use
in practice.'Ihe Court's recognition of a criminal defendant's right to an effective
plea bargainer coincides with a new call for skills instruction.9 s Instruction in
appellate and trial advocacy is commonplace at virtually every law school. A
growing number of law schools have centers on negotiation and virtually all
have classes on negotiation."6 Often advocacy and negotiation courses are taught
by adjuncts and therefore may seem not to get the attention they deserve, but
these courses certainly exist at most every American law school." Although
negotiation courses are available, there is no doubt that an insufficient number
of students take them, even though every single lawyer will need this skill in her
career." Criminal negotiation-plea bargaining-is taught by virtually no one
and involves very different considerations than civil negotiation because of the
power differential between prosecutor and defense lawyer and the prosecutor's
dual advocate-judge role." 'The well-developed models for understanding and
teaching civil negotiation have not yet been adapted for criminal negotiation.
Law schools can ignore skills training in plea bargaining for only so long given
these pressures.
By focusing the attention of defense lawyers and those who train them
on the constitutional significance of the plea bargaining process, the Supreme
Court may have improved criminal representation in ways that will not be
obvious from just looking at the results of post-conviction cases alleging
constitutionally ineffective negotiation.
II. JUDGES
Lafler and Frye impose new burdens on courts hearing ineffective assistance
claims. Courts will first have to determine whether a defendant has suffered
ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining phase.'" Many
lower courts had recognized, prior to these decisions, that a defendant had a
right to effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining phase,' but the
high profile of a Supreme Court decision will certainly increase the number
of claims. Indigent defendants are far more likely to have heard of a ruling
from the high court granting the right to effective assistance during the
negotiation phase than a similar decision from an intermediate appellate court.
95 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN et al., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION OF LAW 113-14 (2007).
96 See McAdoo, supra note 28, at 49.
97 See David Hricik, Life in Dark Waters:A Survey of Ethical and Malpractice Issues Confronting
Adjunct Law Professors, 42 S. TEx. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (2001).
98 See McAdoo, supra note 28, at 49.
99 See discussion infra Part III.
1oo See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (observing that the Court has not yet
defined the duties of defense counsel in criminal negotiations).
105 See Perez, supra note 24, at 1539-40.
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If the numbers since Lafler are any indication, these decisions could open up
the floodgates of litigatioif on this issue requiring courts to develop standards
defining effective assistance at this phase.102 More significantly, the Court in
Lafler instructed lower courts to use their equitable discretion to determine
what remedy to grant a defendant whose attorney unreasonably instructed
him to go to trial."0 3 The Court provided little guidance on how to go about
fashioning such a remedy and thus gave lower courts an interesting burden and
opportunity for creativity.' 04
Courts will no doubt struggle with determining what constitutes ineffective
assistance in proceedings that do not follow any formal process and leave little
in the way of a paper trail to document defense counsel's performance.' 0s Courts
considering habeas corpus petitions have, however, long dealt with similar, if
slightly less thorny, issues. The adequacy of a defense lawyer's investigation is
frequently challenged in post-conviction proceedings.'6 A defense lawyer's
decision not to use limited resources to pursue a particular lead is as much art
as science.' 7 No legal standards explain how to conduct an investigation. Yet,
frequently courts find that attorneys have failed in their Sixth Amendment
duty to investigate their client's cases.' It is at least clear what the result of a
perfect investigation would look like-all the relevant information would be
discovered.There is, however, no model for a perfect negotiation. In determining
whether a violation of a defendant's right to effective counsel occurred at the
plea stage, courts will very much be writing on a blank slate.'09
With recent decisions in Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court has left lower
courts with a more difficult and far more interesting question to resolve: What
remedy applies when a court finds ineffective assistance of counsel? Prior to
Lafler and Frye, when lower courts found a violation at this stage, they granted
one of two remedies: they either ordered a new trial or they ordered the district
attorney to re-offer the plea that had been rejected because of defense counsel's
lapse of duty."0 The Supreme Court rejected these options as too rigid and
102 As of October 31, 2013, a year and a half after these decisions were issued, a Westlaw search
reveals that 1,072 cases cited Lafler. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
103 Id. at 1381.
104 See id. at 1389 ( "[T]he court may exercise discretion in determining whether the defen-
dant should receive the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he
received at trial, or something in between.").
105 But see Wright & Peeples, supra note 7 (observing that effectiveness of lawyers in negotia-
tions could be evaluated by comparing results between lawyers).
1o6 See Stephen F Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ, L. REV. 515 (2009)
(describing the Court's recent cases involving investigation in capital cases).
107 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.374,400-03 (2005) (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (observing how
limited resources force strategic decisions about which investigations to conduct).
io8 This occurs most often in the sentencing phase of capital cases. See Smith, supra note io6.
109 See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("The art of negotiation is at least as
nuanced as the art of trial") (quoting Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 741 (2011).
ino See Perez, supra note 24, at 1535.
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instructed lower courts to use their equitable discretion to fashion a remedy for
a violation."' In considering ineffective assistance of counsel cases with habeas
corpus petitioners, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that those petitioners
should only obtain relief when their convictions were somehow unfair.112 It
would seem to follow that lower courts fashioning remedies for defendants
receiving ineffective assistance at the plea bargaining phase would have to
determine what portion of the plea offer constituted a fair sentence.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must, of course, under
Strickland v. Washington demonstrate that his lawyer "made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment."n3 He must also demonstrate that he suffered prejudice
as a result, which requires him to show "that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 114
After Strickland, the Court emphasized in Lockhart v. Fretwell that an
analysis of prejudice that focuses only on "mere outcome determination, without
attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or
unreliable, is defective."s In Fretwell, the defendant's counsel failed to object
to an aggravating factor supporting his death sentence.1 1 6 The defendant was
convicted of felony murder for a death that occurred during a robbery." His
death sentence was imposed on the basis of the jury's finding of one aggravating
factor: that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain."' After the defendant
was sentenced but before the case was appealed, the Eighth Circuit held that
an aggravating factor that duplicates an element of the offense-as it did in
Fretwell-could not be the basis of a death sentence as the factor did not narrow
the class of persons who were death eligible.' The defendant therefore asserted
that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise this claim,
which would have successfully barred any subsequent effort to obtain the death
penalty.120 By the time the defendant filed his habeas claim asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court held that aggravating factors
duplicating elements of the offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment's
n11 See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410-11.
112 See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Un-
dermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91, 145 (1995) (observing that "the
prejudice prong of Strickland... effectively deincorporates the most fundamental right and deprives
defendants of the effective assistance of counsel unless the trial in retrospect can be seen as 'fun-
damentally unfair..).
113 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
114 Id.
n5 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 5 o6 U.S. 364 ,3 69 (1993).
116 Id. at 366-67.
117 Id





prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 121 Even though the results of the
sentencing hearing would have been different had Fretwell's lawyer objected to
the aggravating factor on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that his death
sentence "was neither unfair nor unreliable."122
Strickland and its progeny therefore seem to require a court reviewing a lost
opportunity to obtain a favorable plea to inquire whether the foregone plea
would have yielded an unfair result. A number of courts prior to Lafler and
Frye concluded that a sentence within the parameters prescribed by the statute
for which a defendant was convicted could not be said to be unfair.'23 These
courts effectively rejected any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during
the negotiation phase. The Supreme Court in Lafler concluded that Fretwell
did not preclude a defendant from demonstrating prejudice as a result of
defective performance in the plea bargaining phase.124 The Court certainly did
not conclude, however, that the principles of Fretwell had nothing to say about
the remedy a defendant should receive. In fact, the Court strongly suggested
that the principles of Fretwell have much to say about the remedy.25 The Court
concluded only that Fretwell did not preclude the possibility of a remedy for
ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining phase.126 Unlike the
defendant in Fretwell, Justice Kennedy observed that the habeas petitioner in
Lafler was not seeking to benefit from the application of an incorrect legal
principle that he missed because of his lawyer's error-he was seeking to obtain
the benefit he would have obtained through the plea process. The Court stated:
[The Petitioner] maintains that, absent ineffective counsel, he would have
accepted a plea offer for a sentence the prosecution evidently deemed
consistent with the sound administration of criminal justice. The favorable
sentence that eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears to be
the sentence he or others in his position would have received in the ordinary
course, absent the failings of counsel.' 7
This part of the opinion makes the remedy seem deceptively simple. Courts
must simply determine what defendants are typically offered for crimes with
similar characteristics, which would actually be a fairly complicated task, but
not nearly as complicated as the task Justice Kennedy ultimately assigns to
lower courts.128
121 Id. at 368 (citing Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)).
122 Id. at 371.
123 See Perez, supra note 24, at 1535.
124 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (202).
125 See id. at 1387.
126 See id. at 1386.
127 Id. at 1387.
128 Susan Klein has similarly proposed that defendants in negotiations ought to be informed
about the standard offer defendants receive in similar cases. See Klein, supra note 82, at 2028. Profes-
sor Stuntz further suggested that the Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes should have required a similar
empirical inquiry. See Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 27. He suggested that the
Court should have forbidden prosecutors to threaten penalties that were not at least occasionally
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Remedies, Kennedy wrote, "must 'neutralize the taint' of a constitutional
violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or
needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in
the criminal prosecution."129 The Court did not explain how to identify plea
offers, or portions of plea offers, that constituted windfalls, but did give courts
great discretion to craft remedies to avoid windfals. Once a trial court has
found ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea phase, the Court instructed
that the nature of the plea offer must be considered.130 If the plea deal offered
a lesser sentence than the defendant received, the trial court is to "exercise
discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the term of
imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he received
at trial, or something in between."" If the plea offer involved a reduction in
the charge, then "the proper exercise of discretion . . . may be to require the
prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal."132 As if that weren't vague enough,
the Court immediately added that once the plea was reoffered, "the judge can
then exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from
trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed."1 3 3 The Court's
given as a tactic to extract pleas. Id. Stuntz's limitation would have looked to actual results as a way
of cabining the practice of plea bargaining. The remedy the Court initially seemed to recommend
in Lafler had a similar look-to-practice feel, but would instead look to bargains typically struck for
such offenses under similar circumstances. Much like the scheme of remedies the Court actually
created, this method of determining the remedy would have had the effect of creating a starting
point in plea negotiations and may have even more quickly pushed the development of a common
law of plea bargaining. For the reasons described below, it is clear that the Court did not fashion
such an easily discernible approach.
129 Lafer, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,364 (1981).
130 Id. at 1389.
131 Id.
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Id. The Court required lower courts to engage in a very similar analysis in Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971). In Santobello, a defendant reached an agreement with the
prosecutor's office that he would plead guilty to the lesser of two of the charges against him and
the prosecution would agree not to make a recommendation at sentencing. Id at 257. By the time
of sentencing, a new prosecutor was assigned to the case who was unaware of the agreement to
remain silent at sentencing and recommended substantial jail time. Id The Court agreed that the
defendant had been denied the benefit of his bargain but, much as the Court in Lafler, returned
the case to the state courts to determine an equitable remedy. Id. at 263 .The Court concluded that
[t]he ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the discretion of the state
court, which is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of this case
require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which
case petitioner should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the
state court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by petitioner, i.e., the
opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Id. Jenia Turner argues that remedies for Sixth Amendment violations prior to Lafler and Frye have
restored defendants to the positions they would have occupied prior to the violation. She therefore
criticizes the Court for allowing a less complete remedy in Lafler. Jenia lontcheva Turner, Effective
Remedies for Ineffective Assistance, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. IOI (2013). She is certainly correct
that the Court has not previously recognized this range of remedies in an ineffective assistance
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moment of greatest clarity in describing the remedy came in the following
paragraph when it recognized that it was telling lower courts virtually nothing
about determining remedies for defendants who had suffered from ineffective
assistance at this phase. "Principles elaborated over time in decisions of state
and federal courts, and in statutes and rules, will serve to give more complete
guidance as to the factors that should bear upon the exercise of the judge's
discretion."1 3 4
With little guidance, judges considering remedies must ask what portion of
the plea offer that the defendant lost, because of ineffective assistance of counsel,
would constitute a windfall to a defendant if he received it through a post-
conviction proceeding. Judge Frank Easterbrook has suggested that the entire
amount of leniency the defendant was offered in a plea deal would amount to
a windfall if the defendant received it after the trial.3 s For Easterbrook, plea
deals are about trading risks-the prosecution exchanges the risk of an acquittal
for the defendant's risk of a sentence longer than the one in the plea deal.
After a trial, as Easterbrook correctly observes, the prosecution has no risk of
an acquittal and thus any remedy provides a windfall.3 6 Prosecutors, however,
make plea offers for reasons other than minimizing the risk of acquittal."3
Justice Kennedy's opinion obviously rejected Judge Easterbrook's view that
a remedy granting any kind of plea offer leniency would constitute a windfall.
His opinion recognizes, though, that post-trial remedies for some portions of
a plea could constitute a windfall. Unpacking which plea offers, or portions
of plea offers, amount to windfalls seems to require a court to analyze why
prosecutors made the offers. Prosecutors make offers for several reasons, only
some of which involve attempts to achieve fair results. Judge Easterbrook's
analysis only accounted for one of these reasons-risk-aversion. 3 1 Prosecutors
agree to pursue lesser charges or shorter jail sentences than those that would
result from trial for a variety of reasons, including: (1) weaknesses in the case;
(2) cooperation by the defendant; (3) administrative costs to the prosecution
in conducting the trial; (4) emotional toll and economic costs to the witnesses;
and (5) equitable considerations not adequately accounted for by the statutory
elements or sentencing guidelines.13 1 Many of these considerations involve
of counsel case previously, but the Court in Santobello did recognize a very similar broad equitable
discretion to provide a range of remedies in a case involving a plea bargain.
134 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
135 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market, 51 Duo, L. REV. 551, 556
(2013).
136 Id.
137 Elsewhere, Judge Easterbrook has recognized a variety of reasons that might drive guilty
pleas and specifically suggested that a plea offer will diverge from estimates of conviction probabil-
ity for notorious crimes. Frank H. Easterbook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 299-302 (1983).
138 See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 35, at 552.
139 See Alschuler, 7he Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 35, at 53-
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quid pro quo exchanges that are not possible once there has been a conviction
and, more importantly, have nothing to do with the appropriateness of the
defendant's sentence.
Post-trial, it would certainly amount to a windfall to grant the defendant the
benefit of a trade that is no longer possible and has nothing to do with how the
defendant ought to be punished. Once a case has been litigated, the prosecution
has no reason to fear weaknesses in the case that will result in an acquittal; the
prosecution has already spent its resources and burdened its witnesses trying
the case. By the time a case reaches post-conviction proceedings, it is unlikely
that a defendant could offer the prosecution anything worthwhile by providing
information or testimony. Courts attempting to give defendants the "fair"
outcome they were denied by rejecting the plea may well attempt to approximate
the portion of the plea driven by the prosecutor's sense of the equitably proper
outcome of the case. Giving the defendant the benefit of a now-unavailable
quid pro quo seems like a windfall inconsistent with Stricklands requirement
that remedies be limited to errors denying fundamental fairness.
At least one court has recognized that a defendant should not receive
the benefits of a plea that were predicated on cooperation that is no longer
possible. In Burt v. Titlow, the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant's lawyer
inappropriately advised his client to go to trial rather than accept a plea offer.14
The appeals court ordered the case remanded to the trial court to fashion a
remedy, observing that the trial court should take into consideration the fact
that the plea offer was at least partially motivated by the defendant's agreement
to testify against a co-defendant. 14' Because the co-defendant had been tried
and acquitted that cooperation was no longer possible.142
Prosecutors do, however, often make decisions that are driven, at least in part,
by fairness considerations. Consider the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes.143 The
defendant was charged with uttering a forged instrument-a check made out
for $88.30 that he had stolen from a Pic Pac in Lexington, Kentucky.'" Under
Kentucky law, this offense could have been charged as felony or a misdemeanor.
The prosecutor chose to charge it as a felony, which carried a penalty between
two and ten years at hard labor, but judges during this period had wide discretion
140 Titlow v. Burt, 68o F 3 d 577,58
6
-92 (6th Cir. 2012).The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit, finding that the lower court had not been adequately deferential to a state court finding
that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Burt v.Titlow, 133 S. Ct. 1457 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013)
(No. 12-414).
141 Titlow, 68o F3 d at 92.Justice Ginsberg similarly appears to embrace the view that defen-
dants should not be given the benefit of leniency based on cooperation even if defendants, on the
advice of counsel, refuse to cooperate. In her concurrence in the Supreme Court reversal of Burt,
Justice Ginsberg observed that there was no plea offer left to be re-offered once the defendant re-
fused to testify against the co-defendant as the plea offer was predicated on the cooperation. Burt,
2013 VL 5904117, at *8.
142 Id. at 592.
143 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 37 (1978).
144 See Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 2.
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as to how sentences were to be served, so even a conviction for the felony may
not have involved any jail time. 145 The defendant, Paul Hayes, however, had
a relatively serious record. He had previously been convicted of detaining a
female, which was a lesser included offense for rape, and a conviction for armed
robbery.146 Hayes was on probation for the armed robbery charge when he tried
to cash the forged check. 47 11The prosecutor therefore made Hayes an offer he
couldn't (to be precise, should not have) refused: if Hayes pled guilty to the
felony offense, with an agreed sentence of five years hard labor, the prosecution
would not seek to have Hayes declared a habitual criminal, which meant a
mandatory life sentence. 148
The prosecution could not have thought life was appropriate for this
crime-even given Hayes' past-or it would have never offered five years as the
alternative. 149 The trial in this case would have been a short one with Hayes'guilt
easy to establish-his accomplice had given a statement against him, and Hayes
was caught at the scene.15 0 'Ibis was not a crime of violence, so there would
have been no emotional toll on the witnesses. Hayes' accomplice had already
confessed and implicated Hayes.s' The prosecution did not need him to convict
other defendants or solve other crimes. None of the utilitarian reasons for a plea
offer-risk aversion, resource preservation, minimizing witness inconvenience
or discomfort, or incentivizing cooperation-could have played a prominent
role in the prosecutor's decision. The prosecutor's decision seems to have been
driven by his sense that five years was an appropriate sentence for a previously
violent offender who returned to crime while still on probation.'52 The plea
offer in this case appears to have been motivated entirely by the quasi-judicial
equitable task implicitly assigned to the prosecutor to determine not only what
crimes had been committed, but which punishments ought to be sought. The
Kentucky Legislature had empowered the prosecutor in Hayes' case to obtain
a life sentence and doing so was not a difficult task. The decision to offer a




148 Id. at 3.
149 Id. at 24.
150 Id. at 5 & n.14
151 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (No. 76-1334), 1977
WL 189700 at *3.
152 The prosecutor in Bordenkircher v. Hayes described his decision to seek a third-strike en-
hancement if the defendant refused the five-year offer to be based on efficiency not equity. During
his cross-examination of Paul Hayes, he asked "isn't it a fact that I told you at that time if you did
not intend to save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking up this time that
I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you based upon these prior felony
convictions?" Id. at 2-3. The discount for pleading, from life to five years, would have been an ex-
traordinary discount to save the prosecution a very brief trial if the prosecutor found life to be an
appropriate sentence.
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of fairness.
As courts start to fashion remedies, they should analyze how prosecutors
determined what plea bargain to offer defendants. This should reveal how much
of an offer is based on a prosecutor's unspoken, equitable considerations of how
a particular defendant ought to be punished. Courts could either consider how
a reasonable prosecutor would have gone about arriving at the rejected offer
or it could attempt to determine what motivated this individual prosecutor. If
courts attempt to reconstruct the thought processes of individual prosecutors,
they will create incentives for prosecutors to document their reasoning in
making offers, thus preventing defendants from attempting to recast all offers
as driven by fairness concerns. In recording the basis for their offers, prosecutors
would look (and perhaps act) much more like the judicial actors they are in the
American inquisitorial justice system.
For a variety of reasons, however, lower courts should not attempt to get
inside the heads of individual prosecutors."s' Inconsistent remedies would
certainly follow from looking at the subjective thought processes of individual
prosecutors, but this is the weakest objection. Every prosecutor will have
idiosyncratic reasons for making a particular plea offer. Inconsistency is
unavoidable in the plea bargaining process. A stronger objection is that making
the subjective motivations of prosecutors relevant to the remedy for ineffective
performance by defense counsel would encourage prosecutors to document the
basis of their offers and discourage offers on the basis of "fairness" grounds
that produce remedies. Prosecutors would have an incentive to report being
motivated only by an interest in minimizing any possible remedy. Prosecutors
would also view themselves as promulgating guidelines. Therefore, another
objection is that guidelines promulgated by legislators or prosecutors tend to
153 Often such efforts are referred to as attempts to examine the subjective motivations of
individuals and such efforts are typically rejected because of the impossibility of the task. See, e.g.,
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,405 (2006) (stating that if basis to believe emergency entry is
permitted, the officer's motivations are irrelevant); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 819 (1996)
(permitting traffic stop on the basis of probable cause regardless of officer's subjective motivations);
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.zd 41,52 (N.Y. 1986) (explaining that the necessity of deadly force to save
one's life is viewed from standard of reasonable person). In this context of evaluating a prosecutor's
motivations for offering a plea, it may actually be possible to evaluate his motivations because he
may state them in making the offer. In fact, in reviewing Batson challenges, trial courts consider
alone the subjective motivations of prosecutors. Judges observe the actors as they engage in the
allegedly discriminatory selection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). But see Jeffrey Bellin &
Junichi P. Semitsu, Widenening Batson's Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. I075, I077 (20II) (observing that the method
of assessing the subjective bias of lawyers in Batson permits lawyers to discriminate with impunity).
There are, however, problems with relying on prosecutors to self-report the motivations for their
plea offers when the consequences of those reports change the remedies defendant may be able to
seek. In the Batson context, the trial judge has witnessed the entire encounter and is therefore in
a good position to evaluate the advocate's veracity in offering his race-neutral justification for the
peremptory strike. In the plea bargaining context, just as in the Batson context, prosecutors would
have an incentive to mis-report, but judges would have a lesser ability to evaluate credibility be-
cause the decision-making would have occurred outside the judge's presence.
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minimize the role of mitigating factors. Sentencing guidelines at the federal
and state level as well as in the United States Attorney's Manual illustrate
this reality.154 Those promulgating rules are, for obvious reasons, institutionally
disinclined to recognize large spheres of discretion. If prosecutors begin to
explain the basis for their pleas, they will be disinclined to acknowledge that
they regard the legislatively prescribed penalties as too harsh in certain cases.
Trial judges, however, occupy a very different institutional role than code-
drafting politicians or law-enforcing prosecutors. A number of federal judges
resigned because the federal sentencing guidelines limited their ability to
consider the individual circumstances of an offender and his crimes.s' The trial
judge's perspective gives him little reason to hide the fact that a plea is driven,
at least in part, by a concern that the facts of this crime do not really "fit" the
crime, even though all the elements of the crime are satisfied. It is the essence of
a trial judge's job to consider all of the circumstances of a defendant's crime and
background and determine an appropriate sentence and do so in a methodical
way on the record-or at least it was in a world before sentencing guidelines.5 6
Trial judges ought to be adept at considering how reasonable prosecutors would
view the equitable considerations in a defendant's case. It may be objected that
in this case the judge would only be substituting his subjective view of the
equities for the prosecutor's, but judges have in a number of contexts been asked
to consider what reasonable and actual prosecutors considered. In reviewing
denials of motions for pretrial diversions, judges are asked to consider what
reasonable prosecutors would do.s' In Batson challenges, judges are asked to
154 Justice Kennedy, for instance, concluded that "the compromise that led to the guidelines
led also to an increase in the length of prison terms."Assoc. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech
at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) (transcript available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-0 9-0 3.html).
See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion and Crime,
58 HASTINGs L. J. 533, 551-52 (2007) (discussing theories of how state guidelines have produced
longer sentences). The United States Attorney's Manual forbids dismissing any readily provable
offense as part of a negotiation, thus creating pushing punishments toward standard, and higher,
penalties. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.400 (2002) ("The basic policy is that charges are not to
be bargained away or dropped, unless the prosecutor has a good faith doubt as to the government's
ability readily to prove a charge for legal or evidentiary reasons."). For a defense of sentences under
the federal guidelines, see Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?:A Defense ofthe Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(and a Critique ofFederal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. IOI7 (2004).
155 See Stewart Dalzell, One Cheer for the Guidelines, 40 VILL. L. REV. 317, 320 (1995); Hon.
Stanley Sporkin, Address at the American University Law Review Dinner (Apr. 20, 1991), in 41
Am. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (5995) (describing the resignation of a United States DistrictJudge); see also Kate
Stith &Jos6 A. Cabranes,Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247,
1254 (1997) (decrying reduction ofjudicial sentencing discretion).
156 Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2oo5), of course made the sentencing guidelines ad-
visory, but the judges who had been handing down sentences under them for years did not radi-
cally change their sentences after Booker. See Jeffery Ulmer & Michael T. Light, Beyond Disparity:
Changes in Federal SentencingAfter Booker and Gall?, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 333, 340 (20l).
157 See Stanislaw Pomerski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime and the 'De Minimus" De-
fense, 1997 BYU L. REv. 51, 52 (1997)-
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determine the actual motivations of prosecutors.ss It therefore does not seem
to be a stretch to ask a judge to consider how much leniency a reasonable
prosecutor would have attributed to any particular factor when making the plea
offer.
Courts specifically have experience in determining whether a decision
was motivated by equitable considerations and giving that distinction a
legal consequence. Courts look at the reason a conviction was overturned on
post-conviction to determine whether the conviction will have immigration
consequences. When convictions are vacated because of "procedural or
substantive defects in the underlying proceeding," those convictions may not
serve as the basis for deportation.s' Where, however, a sentence is "vacated
because of postconviction events, such as rehabilitation or immigration
hardships," the immigration consequences of the conviction remain despite
the fact that the conviction was vacated. 6 0 As one court stated it, where the
vacation of the conviction is of a "purely equitable"basis or to avoid deportation,
the conviction remains valid for the purposes of immigration law.16'
More significantly, judges are permitted to reject guilty pleas as too lenient
only when the judge determines that the prosecutor has given too much weight
to equitable considerations calling for leniency. In the leading case on this issue,
United States v. Ammidown, the D.C. Circuit reversed a trial judge's refusal to
accept a guilty plea, holding that in only in extreme cases could a judge make
such a refusal. 162 Under no condition, however, could the trial judge second-
guess a plea offer motivated by concerns about how prosecutorial resources
should be spent, or one based on a prosecutor's view of the strength of the
case.163 Ammidown thus requires courts to determine the basis of a prosecutor's
decision to offer leniency in a plea. Courts therefore have the institutional
competence to make these evaluations.
While commentators have reasonably suggested that few defendants will
obtain relief under Lafler and Frye,'"M the number of cases reversed will not be
negligible. The most commonly used basis for rejecting an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim-lack of prejudice to the defendant-will not be available
when a defendant claims his lawyer was ineffective in the negotiation process.
158 See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception andDiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV.
9, 32-33 (1997) (observing that Batson calls for a judge to make a subjective determination but that
the Court could have been concluding that a discriminatory impact was sufficient); Russell D.
Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66
MD. L. REV. 279, 284 (2007). See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
159 See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECILIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONs: LAw, POLICY AND PRACTICE 134-35 (2013).
160 Id. at 135 (quoting In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624, 2003 WL 21358480 (B.I.A.
2003)).
161 Id. at 135 (citing Renteria-Gonzales v. I.N.S., 322 F.3 d 804,812-13 (5 th Cir. 2002)).
162 United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
163 Id. at 621-23.
164 See Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, supra note 25, at 152.
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The Supreme Court in Strickland observed that most claims could be quickly
rejected by concluding that a lawyer's alleged deficiency did not prejudice the
defendant; that is, the result of the trial or sentencing hearing would have been
the same if the lawyer had performed as he should have.165 When a defendant
claims that his lawyer ineffectively represented him in the negotiation process,
he is claiming that he either took a worse deal than was offered or that his lawyer
could have obtained,' 66 or that he went to trial and received a greater sentence
than he was offered or should have been offered had his lawyer performed
effectively.16 1 Unlike in a trial where a reviewing court is left to speculate
about the result that counsel's failure had on the verdict, no speculation will be
necessary to demonstrate that the defendant was prejudiced from his counsel's
unreasonable conduct during negotiations. The sentence the defendant would
have received from the plea offer that was not communicated to him, or the
defendant would have received had he not gone to trial, will be evident from
the case records. And a defendant would only bring a post-conviction claim if
those plea offers provided for a lesser sentence than he actually received.'
No doubt courts will defer to many of the defense counsel decisions during
the negotiation process as strategic choices, but this is true for the decisions of
counsel during the trial and appeal as well. In fact, there may be fewer purely
strategic choices in trials and appeals than in negotiations. The most frequent
source of successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims is attorneys' failure
to investigate, and these claims are most successful in the sentencing phase of
capital cases where the jury can consider any mitigating factor in choosing life
over death.6' Plea bargaining is much like the sentencing phase of a capital
case in that a prosecutor can consider anything in deciding whether to extend
mercy.170 Failure to investigate and present equitable arguments to prosecu-
tors seems as problematic as a defense lawyer's failure to investigate mitigating
circumstances, though sentencing consequences are regarded by most as less
severe in any non-capital case."' Courts will thus have a non-trivial number
165 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
166 In Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404-05 (2012), defense counsel had actually obtained
a deal better than the one the defendant ultimately accepted, but had failed to communicate the
offer to the defendant.
167 See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
168 David Abrams' empirical research of sentencing in Chicago suggests that there will not
be that many cases in which defendants go to trial and receive jail terms longer than they were
offered in plea bargains. David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
200 (2011). His results are counter-intuitive to virtually everyone who has worked in the criminal
justice system but definitely worthy of further exploration. At least one academic has been strongly
critical of his Abrams' conclusion. See Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small BandAids
for a Festering Wound, 51 Duo, L. REv. 673, 687-91 (2013)-
169 See Adam Laparello, Establishing Guidelines forAttorney Representation of CriminalDefen-
dants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REV. 97, 138 (200).
170 See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Attica, 477 F2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
171 Justice Stewart observed in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) that "[d]
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of cases in which they are required to develop a remedy for petitioners whose
attorneys were ineffective negotiators.
A remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel that permits a judge to grant
a defendant only part of the leniency he would have received under the plea will
certainly appeal to trial judges. It is politically difficult to reverse convictions
or sentences when there is little or no doubt about the defendant's guilt and
the court has spent the time trying the defendant. It certainly requires a
measure of creativity to look behind the plea offer and ask what part of the
plea offer was driven by quid pro quo exchanges and what part was driven
by a prosecutor's sense that the offer represented a fair outcome. Trial judges
tend to avoid creativity for fear of appellate reversal. 2 But some principled
basis will be necessary to exercise the discretion afforded lower courts to grant
remedies less lenient than those contained in lost plea offers. Such creativity
is consistent with Stricklands insistence on fairness in remedy and Lafler's
concern that defendants not receive windfalls in post-conviction proceedings.
And the development of a record at the trial court level would be helpful, if
not essential, to appellate courts'fashioning a remedy based on the prosecutor's
subjective determination of what punishment fits the crime. The incentives trial
level courts have to minimize the impact of post-conviction remedies may well
cause them to take up the opportunity to define the appropriate use of the
prosecutorial function to charge and bargain.
III. PROSECUTORS
The unchecked power of prosecutors to decide which charges to bring and
what plea to offer the defendant is problematic for all the reasons that led to
sentencing guidelines. There is no reason to believe that prosecutors will be
more consistent in their exercise of discretion than judges. In fact, there are
several reasons to believe the contrary. A prosecutor has never had to explain
his decision to seek certain charges and not others, or to offer or accept a
plea bargain. Even in the bygone era of extraordinary judicial discretion, the
sentencing hearing required an explanation of the judge's decision. There are
no transparency requirements for prosecutors and thus, unlike judges, there is
no system for routinely evaluating their reasoning. Prosecutorial charging and
plea bargaining decisions-which can have a greater effect on a defendant's
punishment than any decision made by a judge-knows virtually no limits.
eath, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a oo-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two."
172 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 506 (Little, Brown 3 d. ed.
1986); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin,Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, I30 (1980);
Kate Stith, The Risk ofLegalError in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences oftheAsymmetry in the Right
to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1990).
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The late Professor William Stuntz has argued that the extraordinary range
of conduct criminalized by legislatures, combined with the absence of any
limitation on prosecutorial charging decisions, has permitted prosecutors an
unchecked power to determine who shall be punished and how much."
Prosecutors can determine what charges to bring, what bargains to offer,
and what processes to use to determine both the appropriate charge and the
appropriate plea. As described above, Lafier and Frye should encourage defense
lawyers to systematically develop their skills as negotiators and provide judges
an incentive to provide guidance on what the results of these negotiations
should look like.
These soft-limits on prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining are long
overdue. One after another, the Supreme Court's opinions have rejected any
limit on the prosecutorial prerogative, despite a host of criticism for vesting
extraordinary, unchecked authority in the hands of a government official.
Separation of powers concerns have prevented judicial oversight over initial
charging decisions. 17 4 A healthy respect for the practice of plea bargaining has
impeded any work to set limits on the gap between the initial charge and the
plea offer."7 Finally, liberty of contract principles have been used to justify
permitting prosecutors, with defendants' consent, to circumvent procedural
protections that would otherwise be available during pre-trial proceedings.'1 6
Lafler and Frye may empower defense counsel to impose limitations on
prosecutors through the negotiation process itself, taking advantage of the very
principles that have previously thwarted regulation. Should these decisions
achieve this goal, they will be regarded as some of the Court's finest work,
legally and politically."' Without reversing long-existing doctrines or ordering
changes to established practices, circumstances in the trenches may change. A
conversation about the appropriate uses of plea bargaining may well follow from
the work judges are now asked to do. Outlier prosecutors, both the excessively
harsh and the excessively lenient, may feel pressured to moderate their positions.
A discussion about the justifications for common charging and bargaining
173 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, ioo MicH. L. REV. 505, 537-38
(2001); see also HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE IN-
NOCENT 185 (2011).
174 Rachel Barkow has argued persuasively that while historical practice and constitutional
text support deference to prosecutors in criminal matters, such deference is unwise. Rachel E. Bar-
kow, Separation ofPowers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1024-28.
175 Numerous legal scholars have found substantial gaps between the initial charge (or the
threatened charge) and the plea offer to be problematic. See, e.g., RICHARD L. LIPPKE,THE ETHICS
OF PLEA BARGAINING 3I (20II); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecuto-
rialDiscretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 85r, 868-70 (1995).
176 See Meares, supra note 174, at 869-7o.
177 See Donald A. Dripps, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court: The End ofthe Beginning?,
25 FED. SENT'G REP. 141,141-42 (2012) ("If, indeed, we ever reach a system of transparent, regulated,
and accountable plea incentives, we will look back at Padilla, Frye, and Lafler as the cases that initi-
ated the metamorphosis.").
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practices may ensue. To understand how significant such developments would
be, it is important to look at how thoroughly the Court has previously deferred
to the discretion of prosecutors to charge and set the terms of negotiation.
A. Charging Decisions
Courts have repeatedly and categorically rejected the idea that they
have the authority to exercise any oversight over prosecutor's charging and
plea bargaining. In Oyler v. Boles, the Supreme Court in 1962 considered an
equal protection challenge to a life sentence under West Virginia's habitual
criminal act, which provided for a mandatory life sentence for the third felony,
but only if the prosecutor filed an information seeking the enhanced penalty
prior to sentencing.17s Two defendants sentenced under this law objected that
the enhancement was not sought against all defendants who were eligible for
the mandatory life punishment.'7 9 One of the two defendants contended that
during a fifteen-year period, there were five others in his county eligible for
this enhancement-but the prosecutor sought it only in his case.' He further
asserted that West Virginia prosecutors chose not to seek the enhancement
against 904 other defendants.''
The Court concluded that "[t]he statistics merely show that according to
penitentiary records a high percentage of those subject to the law have not been
proceeded against."'82 Nothing, the Court concluded, showed that prosecutors
were aware that the other defendants were eligible for the enhancements.8 ' The
Court's reasoning went much further. Even if the prosecutors had known about
the prior offenses of these other defendants, respect for separation of powers
prevented the Court from doing anything about it so long as the decisions
to seek, or not seek, the enhancement were not based on a constitutionally
protected criteria:
[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a
federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case might
imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection
was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification.184
178 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 449 (1962). In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-29 (2003),
the Court considered California's three-strikes law and found it constitutional.The California law,
in contrast to the West Virginia law, gave a trial judge considerable discretion to determine that
sentencing under the provision was inappropriate and, once the judge found the third-strike provi-
sion appropriate, required only a twenty-five year minimum. Id. West Virginia's law knew no such
discretion and had a mandatory life penalty. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 449.
179 Oyler, 368 U.S. at 454-56.
180 Id. at 454-55.
181 Id.
182 Id at 456.
183 Id
184 Id. at 456.
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Almost two decades later, the Supreme Court would again be asked to
consider whether a prosecutor's charging decision violated the Constitution.
In United States v. Batchelder, two federal statutes prohibited the receipt of
a firearm by an individual with a felony conviction."'s One of the statutory
provisions provided for a maximum two-year penalty; the other provided for
a maximum five-year penalty."' The provisions were otherwise substantively
indistinguishable.' 1 The defendant, who was sentenced under the five-year
statute, therefore argued that either Congress intended the more lenient statute,
which was the later-enacted statute, to be the sole punishment for possession of
a firearm by a felon, or if Congress had no such intent, that giving prosecutors
the option to choose between the statutes ran afoul of the Constitution.' 8
The Court in Batchelder held that neither contention was true: Congress
did not intend to effectively repeal the first statute with the subsequent more
lenient one, nor did the Constitution forbid vesting this sort of discretion in
the hands of prosecutors."' The Court found that the principle of lenity that
would limit the prosecution to the less severe statute would have only applied
if there were an ambiguity about whether the defendant had violated the more
severe statute.' The Court held that it was clear the defendant had violated
both statutes.'
The Seventh Circuit, when it considered Batchelder, concluded that the
"due process and equal protection interest[s] in avoiding excessive prosecutorial
discretion" limited the prosecutor to charging the defendant with the less
severely punished crime. 92 The Supreme Court did not share the lower court's
willingness to intrude on the prosecutorial prerogative.The Court observed that
there is no appreciable difference between the discretion a prosecutor
exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two statutes with
different elements and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two
statutes with identical elements. In the former situation, once he determines
that the proof will support conviction under either statute, his decision is
indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context."'
885 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 116 (1979).
186 Id. at 116-17.
187 The jurisdictional elements of the two offenses were different. The offense carrying the five
year maximum required the government to demonstrate that the gun possessed had traveled in in-
terstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(h) (197o). The offense carrying the maximum two-year penalty
required the government to demonstrate that the firearm was received, possessed, or transported in
interstate commerce or that the defendant's possession, receipt or transportation of the gun affected
interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1970).
188 Batcbelder, 442 U.S. at 118.
189 Id. at 122-23.
190 Id. at 121-22.
191 Id. at 121.
192 Id. at 124.
193 Id. at 125.
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The obvious, but unstated, premise is that the Constitution imposes no
limitation on a prosecutor to make a charging decision among a range of
options provided by the legislature, unless, as the Court observed, that decision
was based on "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification" as previously
recognized in Oyler v. Boles.'9 4 Likely anticipating the Court's strong respect
for separation of powers, especially when dealing with prosecutors, Batchelder
argued that allowing prosecutors to select among identical offenses created
a problem of executive encroachment into the legislative function.' The
legislature had, according to the Seventh Circuit, "impermissibly delegate[d]
to the Executive Branch the Legislature's responsibility to fix criminal
penalties."'96 The Court disagreed, noting that the degree of discretion the
legislature conferred on prosecutors to choose among the two statutes was "no
broader than the authority they routinely exercise in enforcing the criminal
laws."'97 Doubtlessly the Court was on solid ground with this observation. The
extraordinary discretion of prosecutors to charge defendants was frequently
noted.198 The Court's observation does not, however, defend the constitutionality
of conferring extraordinary discretion on prosecutors; it merely illustrates that
the phenomenon is widespread.
There is little impact even to the limitations on prosecutorial discretion that
the Court has recognized. While other courts have recognized that charging
decisions may not be made on the basis of race, religion, or other improper
motives, the Supreme Court has made it very difficult to go about demonstrating
that a prosecution was commenced on the basis of such an improper motive.
In United States v. Armstrong, defendants claimed that African Americans were
selected for crack cocaine prosecutions on the basis of their race."' In support
of this claim, the defendant offered evidence that only African Americans in
the particular district had been the subject of crack cocaine indictments despite
the fact that state courts were prosecuting white defendants for this crime
and treatment centers were admitting white patients for crack cocaine use.200
The defendants sought, on this basis, to have the United States Attorney's
Office provide the reasons why it chose to prosecute.2 01 The Court found that
the defendants had made an insufficient threshold showing of race-based
prosecutions to justify obtaining this information. 202 The problem of crafting a
remedy, if discriminatory prosecution had ultimately been found, undoubtedly
contributed to the Court's reluctance to permit the discovery of evidence that
194 Id. at 124-25; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
195 Batchelder, 422 U.S. at 114.
196 Id at 125.
197 Id at 126.
198 See id. at IIS,123-26.
199 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,459 (1996).
200 Id. at 459.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 458.
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would have proven the claim.203 The upshot of Armstrong is nevertheless that
the extraordinary discretion given to prosecutors practically extends to decisions
potentially based on constitutionally impermissible grounds.
Courts have demonstrated the same reluctance to intervene in prosecutors'
decisions to decline charges as they have prosecutors' decisions to pursue
charges. In Inmates ofAttica v. Rockefeller, guards retaking a maximum security
prison following a riot allegedly used unnecessary force on captured inmates
and committed unjustified killings.2" Surviving inmates and the families of
those killed in the retaking of Attica sought to compel state and federal officials
to conduct more thorough investigations than those conducted and prosecute
those who had violated federal and state laws.205 The Second Circuit affirmed
the decision of the lower court denying the requested writ of mandamus,
noting that respect for the discretion of prosecutors prevented such an order. 206
The court recognized that "[t]he primary ground upon which this traditional
judicial aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based is the separation
of powers doctrine."207 The inmates and families observed that the federal law
"authorized and required' United States Attorneys "to institute prosecutions
against all persons" violating the civil rights laws they alleged the Attica guards
violated. 200 The Second Circuit observed that the "required" language in the
statute was not sufficiently clear to abrogate the widely recognized broad
discretion of prosecutors. 209
The Second Circuit in Inmates ofAttica suggested that courts lacked certain
institutional competence to determine which charges were appropriate.
In the absence of statutorily defined standards governing reviewability, or
regulatory or statutory policies of prosecution, the problems inherent in
the task of supervising prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves to
resolution by the judiciary. The reviewing courts would be placed in the
undesirable and injudicious posture of becoming "superprosecutors."o
Institutional competence does not,however, seem to be driving the reluctance
of courts to review the charging decisions of prosecutors. Statutes authorizing
courts to exercise some oversight over prosecutorial discretion rarely provide
anything close to clarity and require the same sort of decision-making believed
203 By contrast, Batson v. Kentucky requires an advocate to offer a race-neutral explanation of
a pre-emptory strike, but the remedy for such a violation is quite simple. See Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
204 Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375' 376 (2d Cir. 1973).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 379-80.
207 Id. at 379-
2o8 Id. at 381. (quoting 12 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (2osz))
209 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (2012)) ("The mandatory nature of the word 'required' as it
appears in § 1987 is insufficient to evince a broad Congressional purpose to bar the exercise of
executive discretion in the prosecution of federal civil rights crimes.").
210 Id. at 380.
[ VOL. 10236
2013- 20141 COMMON LAW OF PLEA BARGAINING
to be in the exclusive domain of prosecutors. Courts conducting proportionality
review of death sentences are not looking at whether the legal criteria for the
punishment are satisfied. They are asking whether the case, notwithstanding
the fact the legal criteria have been satisfied, is as aggravated as cases typically
yielding the penalty.21 Some states have adopted the Model Penal Code's
provision permitting judges to dismiss de minimis infractions of statutes.212
Under this provision, a prosecution may be dismissed if the defendant's conduct
is customarily tolerated, did not threaten or cause the harm contemplated by
the statute, or could not reasonably be regarded as within the legislature's
contemplation in passing the statute.2 13 Finally, statutes in a number of states
require prosecutors to explain their decision not to allow a defendant pre-trial
diversion and permit courts to review the reasoning of prosecutors for abuse of
discretion.2 14
B. Lack of Substantive Limits on Plea Bargaining
The Supreme Court's first foray into plea bargaining in 1970 did no more
than recognize that convictions were legitimate even though they were part of
an agreement between the prosecutor and defendant to lessen the defendant's
exposure to criminal penalties.Ihe further the Court delved into cases involving
plea bargaining, the more it became apparent that this process, whose very
legitimacy was questioned prior to 1970, was not only permissible but knew no
constitutional limits whatsoever.
It is generally assumed that plea bargaining was underground until well into
the second half of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court expressly
found a plea made as part of a deal to be voluntary.215 Given the prevalence of
such bargains, however, it is hard to imagine that trial courts were unaware of
211 See David S. Baime, Comparative Proportionality Review: The New jersey Experience, CIM.
L. BULL., Spring 2005, available at WestlawNext 41 No. 2 Crim. Law Bulletin ART 6 (observing
that no criteria guide proportionality review); see also Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Pro-
portionality Review of Capital Cases (with Lessons from New jersey), 64 ALE. L. REV. II61, 1162 (2001)
(contending that "comparative proportionality review is unwarranted, methodically unsound, and
theoretically incoherent").
212 As well as states that have directly adopted the MPC provisions, several more have en-
acted similar (but not identical) provisions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (2012); Stanislaw Po-
morski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the "De Minimis" Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51,
82 (1997); Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the Existing
Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829, 833-39 (1999).
213 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (2012). See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses:A Sys-
tematic Analysis, 8z COLUM. L. REV. 199, 209 n.31 (1982) (describing statute).
214 See Debra T Landis, Annotation, Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing
Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant's Consent to NoncriminalAlternative, 4
A.L.R.4 th 147 (198i).
215 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970). See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation
ofPowers and the CriminalLaw, supra note 40, at 1044 ("plea bargaining existed as an underground
and unapproved practice for most of the nation's history"); see also discussion supra note 40.
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the practice. A survey of federal judges in 1956 found that entry of a guilty plea
was a basis for a more lenient sentence.216 Al Alschuler observed in 1968 that
plea bargaining had received remarkably good press.217
Plea bargaining was nevertheless inconsistent with the oft-recognized rule
that a plea could not be induced by a threat or promise of any kind.218 A plea
bargain, of course, is induced by just these sorts of pressures.2 19 One can view
the bargain as either a promise by the government not to seek the most serious
conviction or severe sentence if he takes the deal-or a threat to attempt the
most serious consequences for the defendant if he does not accept the offer.
Until 1970, the Supreme Court had not resolved the conflict between the
requirements for a plea bargain and the reality that a number of defendants
were entering pleas in exchange for the hope, if not the express promise, of
leniency. With Brady v. United States, the Court for the first time formally
recognized that a guilty plea could be voluntary even if induced by a promise
of less punishment. 2 0 Brady claimed that he pleaded guilty to avoid the
death penalty.221 The facts of Brady's case are unusual because the possibility
of execution was not removed through a promise from the prosecution. 'The
federal kidnapping statute under which Brady was charged was drafted in such
a way that a death sentence could only follow from a jury verdict. 222 By pleading
guilty, Brady escaped execution regardless of the prosecution's willingness to
trade Brady's trial right for his life.223 As a peculiar side note to the Brady
decision, the Court held in United States v. Jackson-decided two years before
Brady's case-that the burden the federal kidnapping statute placed on trials
was unconstitutional.22 4 Brady therefore alleged, to no avail, that he had pleaded
guilty to avoid an unconstitutional sentence. 225 The Court reasoned that while
216 See Comment, supra note 40, at 207.
217 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, supra note 35, at 5I.
218 See RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ,JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEBRA A. LIVINGS-
TON & ANDREw D. LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1203 (3 d ed. 20n1).
219 The difficulty of strictly adhering to principles of general applicability still exists today. Le-
niency in exchange for testimony seems to be a purchase of that testimony, yet practically prosecu-
tors must have a way to encourage co-conspirators to testify against one another, so the law assumes
there is no problem. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F 3 d 1343, 1344-52 (ioth Cir. 1998) (holding
that because § 2o(c)(2) states that "whoever"gives a witness anything of value for or because of his
testimony has violated the statute, a plain-meaning reading of the statute must include a federal
prosecutor's giving a witness a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony), rev'd en banc, 165
F.3d 1297 (ioth Cir. 1999).
220 Brady, 397 U.S. at 751.
221 Id. at 743-44.
222 See Joseph L. Hoffman, Marcy L. Kahn & Steven W. Fisher, Plea Bargaining in the Shad-
ow ofDeath, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2314-16 (2001) (observing the inconsistent treatment of the
defendants in Brady and Jackson).
223 See id. at 2313-22.
224 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
225 Brady, 397 U.S. at 744-51.
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avoidance of the death penalty may have been one of Brady's motivations, other
factors may have also led to the plea, including his factual guilt.226 he Court
further emphasized that the defendant was advised by an attorney who was,
presumably, able to weigh the strength of the evidence that would be presented
at trial and determine whether accepting the plea was in Brady's interest. 227
Promises or threats were different, the Court reasoned, in the interrogation
context, as suspects unaided by counsel were unable to decide whether providing
information was worth the exchange offered. 2 8
Reading Jackson and Brady side by side, one is struck by the disparate
treatment the two men received. Jackson successfully filed a pre-trial motion
to have the death penalty provision of the federal kidnapping statute declared
unconstitutional, and tried his case with no risk of execution. 229 Brady's lawyer
did not file a similar pre-trial motion and Brady pleaded guilty to avoid the
death penalty.23 0 When the death penalty provision that prompted Brady's plea
was declared unconstitutional, Brady was not afforded an opportunity to go to
trial or restart plea negotiations without the threat of execution. 231
Brady and jackson also reveal something about the Court's unique deference
to prosecutors. Injackson, the Court concluded that the legislature is forbidden to
burden a defendant's right to trial by attaching a greater penalty to a conviction
resulting from a trial than one resulting from a guilty plea.232 However, Brady
established that the Constitution is not offended if the prosecution chooses
to exchange a lesser penalty for procedural protections.2 33 Deference to
prosecutorial discretion is usually defended on separation of powers principles. 23 4
ButJackson denied the legislature the power to trade leniency for constitutional
rights.2 35 Brady gave only prosecutors this power.236 The legislative provision at
issue in Jackson guaranteed leniency to any defendant who waived his right to
trial. Prosecutors are not required to comply with this or any neutral principle
of application. They may decide for virtually any reason to exchange a lesser
sentence for a waiver of trial.237
226 Id. at 749-50,758.
227 Id. at 749, 754.
228 Id. at 754-55.
229 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572, 591.
230 See Hoffman, Kahn & Fisher, supra note 221, at 2314-15.
231 Id. at 2314-x6, 2321.
232 Jackson at 390 U.S. at 581-85.
233 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755-53.
234 See Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40; see also supra text
accompanying note 4o.
235 See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-72,581-85.
236 Cf Barkow, Separation ofPowers and the Criminal Law, supra note 40, at 1048 (observing
that courts defer to prosecutors more completely than they do many other actors in the law).
237 See Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 172.
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The case of North Carolina v. Alford forced the Court to resolve the question
of whether a threatened penalty was alone a sufficient basis for a voluntary
plea."' The defendant, facing a possible death sentence, agreed to plead guilty
in exchange for a thirty-year maximum sentence.23 Unlike the defendant in
Brady, however, Alford refused to admit his guilt.240 Nothing other than the
prosecution's threat of a death sentence explained Alford's willingness to enter
this plea. The Court concluded that so long as there was a "factual basis" for
the charge the prosecution brought, the plea was constitutional.2 41 A/ford thus
trusted prosecutors with extraordinary discretion. Again in Aford, the Court
observed that the defendant acted on the advice of counsel.242 A/ford not only
demonstrated limited oversight of charging decisions, but also revealed that the
Court required little supervision over negotiations between prosecutors and
defense lawyers.
Brady and Alford were not without their problematic parts, but the offers
themselves did not look unreasonable. Brady, of course, involved the threat of an
unconstitutional death sentence. 243 Alford involved a plea that, according to the
terms of the defendant's plea, was motivated alone by the prosecution's threat
of a death sentence. Yet, the fifty-year offer given to Brady was effectively a life
sentence, and the thirty-year sentence Alford received was also a substantial
period of time.2" If the prosecution offered a defendant facing a capital charge
a plea, a very long prison sentence was the least amount of consideration that
could be offered. These offers do not call into question the legitimacy of the
prosecutorial decision to seek the death penalty, nor do these offers themselves
raise questions about defendants' reasons for accepting them. It is somewhat
hard to imagine an innocent defendant agreeing to a life sentence merely to
avoid execution.
If Brady and Alfordwere representative of the type of plea offers prosecutors
were offering in the early 1970s, then prosecutors had not, at that point,
assumed the adjudicative role they have in the modern criminal justice system.
Perhaps uncertainty about the constitutionality of plea bargaining kept the
gap between threatened punishment and plea offers to a minimum. After the
Supreme Court's recognition of the legitimacy of plea bargaining, however, it
was clear that prosecutors were using their vast charging discretion to avoid
trials without reducing the amount of time served.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, discussed above, was the first case in which the
Supreme Court took a look at the fill brunt of the power it was authorizing
with Brady and Alford. Paul Hayes forged and uttered a check he stole from a
238 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28-31,38-39 (1970).
239 Id. at 25.
240 Id. at 28.
241 Id. at 38.
242 Id at 31.
243 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
244 See id. at 744; Aford, 400 U.S. at 28-29 (describing Alford's sentence).
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Pic Pac in Lexington, Kentucky, his third felony, which meant the prosecutor
could seek a mandatory life sentence.245 For a defendant who has no good
defense to a crime, a term of any years is a good deal compared to a life sentence.
By authorizing a life sentence for any third felony, the Kentucky Legislature
transferred power from judges to prosecutors to determine fair sentences.
Prosecutors were given the ability to make offers defendants couldn't refuse. 246
Bordenkircher thus expressly recognized that extraordinary power would rest
in the hands of prosecutors. Criminal codes defining most prohibited acts in a
variety of ways, mandatory minimums, three strikes laws, and later sentencing
guidelines, gave prosecutors the power to put enormous pressure on defendants
to accept pleas. At least some judges after Bordenkircher have demonstrated
discomfort with the vast powers given to prosecutors. For example, in Newton v.
Rumery, the majority of the Supreme Court approved of a criminal defendant's
waiver of liability for illegal arrest. 247 The majority concluded, quite reasonably,
that if a defendant could voluntarily waive his constitutionally guaranteed
procedural protections in exchange for leniency, then he could certainly waive
his right to a civil action in exchange for leniency in a criminal matter.2 48
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Rumery, however, raised potential
concerns about the coercive nature of an agreement like this one. 249 She
concluded that a court considering whether the waiver of liability was valid
should look at a number of factors, including the criminal charge that was
dismissed.250 As she noted, "the greater the charge, the greater the coercive
effect."25 1 While this point is undeniably true, its logical extension calls into
question the threat of severe criminal penalties to obtain a plea involving
considerably less severe sanctions-the very sort of threat brought against Paul
Hayes. 252
245 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1978).
246 As Albert Alschuler has nicely described the power of prosecutors to create "good deals"
for defendants, when a gunman makes you an offer of "your money or your life," surrendering your
money is certainly the better option, but says nothing about the legitimacy of the choice to which
the victim was put. See Alschuler, Lafler and Frye, supra note 167, at 698.
247 Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,387 (z987).
248 Id at 397-98.
249 See id. at 399.
250 Id.
251 Id at 401.
252 It is interesting that Justice O'Connor raises this concern as she joined the portion of the
Court's opinion comparing these agreements to plea bargaining. See id. at 400, 402.
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C. Lack of Procedural Limits on Plea Bargaining
Just as the Supreme Court has permitted prosecutors extraordinary
discretion with the substantive decisions in plea bargaining-i.e., what
charges and pleas to offer-it has similarly deferred to prosecutors to define
the procedures leading up to a plea. Pre-trial proceedings are heavily regulated
both by statutory and constitutional limitations. As for conditions of accepting
pleas, however, prosecutors appear to have all but unlimited power to require
defendants to waive those pre-trial protections. In this context, there are times
when the prosecution and defense interests overlap, which gives them the power
to bargain around the conditions. Even if the prosecution's offer is a contract of
adhesion, it may well benefit defendants. The cases nevertheless illustrate the
lack of any judicial oversight of this process.
In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Court permitted a defendant to waive
the immunity the Federal Rules of Evidence provide for plea negotiations. 253
Justice Thomas noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 permits a defendant
and his lawyer to speak candidly with the prosecutor in an effort to reach a
settlement offer without fear that admissions made in this context could
be used in the prosecution's case. 25 4 But, as in Mezzanatto, a defendant can
waive that protection if, in exchange for a meeting with the prosecutor, the
defendant agrees to allow any statements made in that meeting to be used for
impeachment purposes at trial.255 The reason a prosecutor would seek a waiver is
obvious.Through such a mechanism, the prosecutor has not committed himself
to any amount of leniency if the suspect's information is of limited use-or
if his culpability turns out to be much greater than initially realized.256 If a
deal is not struck, information learned during the negotiation process provides
the prosecution valuable evidence to be used at trial. More importantly, the
prosecutor's ability to use the defendant's statements from the negotiation-
which will make the prosecution's case much more solid-provides an assurance
that the defendant will cooperate fully and honestly. Prosecutors often have to
decide quickly which suspects to cooperate with. A mechanism that ensures
the reliability of the information they are obtaining from suspects allows
prosecutors to make these decisions better.
The opportunity to make such a proffer also presents potential upsides for
the defendant. The prosecution may well be willing to offer a better deal to
defendants making blind-and admissible-waivers than they are to defendants
who condition information on specific assurances. 257 Specific deals must be
253 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 2o9 (1995).
254 Id. at 197, 207.
255 Id. at 198.
256 The best known example of a deal driven purely driven by a quid pro quo exchange would
be the five-year sentence given to Sammy "the Bull" Gravano, who admitted to killing nineteen
people. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation's Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 903,956 (2011).
257 See Richman, supra note 51, at 94, 98; Eric Rasmussen, Mezzanato and the Economics of
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disclosed to co-defendants and almost surely will be used to undermine the
credibility of cooperating witnesses. The earlier the prosecution is aware that
it has a reliable cooperating conspirator, the greater the opportunity for the
defendant to provide helpful information and accordingly receive a reduction
in his sentence.2 5 8
This argument is, however, somewhat reminiscent of the liberty of contract
argument made against minimum wage and maximum hour laws in the early
twentieth century. Laws forbidding workers to work for less than a specified
amount were said to interfere with the liberty of the worker to agree to work
for a less money, longer hours, or in unsafe conditions.259 Defendants in the
modern criminal justice system are permitted to waive their evidentiary
privilege to inadmissible plea negotiations just as workers in the early twentieth
century were permitted to work for any amount of money, regardless of what
the legislature regarded the minimum wage to be. The practical reality was,
of course, that in a labor-flooded market the absence of regulation permitted
employers to determine salaries. Similarly, prosecutors are now able to deal only
with those suspects who are willing to waive their right to discuss cooperation
agreements without risk of incrimination. Permitting this waiver does not
increase the options for defendants but instead shifts power to prosecutors so
they may interrogate risk-averse suspects.
Surely there are checks on the amount of leniency a prosecutor will offer,
but the individual defendant has no idea what sort of deal he is receiving. The
prosecutor's concern that a subsequent defendant will learn of a less-than-
sufficiently lenient deal and refuse to cooperate with her provides the defendant's
only protection in this situation. There is a market check on a prosecutor's
determination of the appropriate amount of leniency post-cooperation, but
substantial pressure is placed on a defendant who has no way of knowing if
market pressure will constrain this particular prosecutor.
In 2002, the Supreme Court recognized that prosecutors could effectively
remove the defense counsel's involvement in their client's case. In United States
v. Ruiz, the Court held that acceptance of a plea offer could be premised on a
defendant's waiver of "the right to receive impeachment information relating
to any informants or other witnesses."260 In Ruiz, the prosecution did agree
to disclose "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the
defendant."261' Ruiz obviously raises a question about why the prosecution would
SelfRegulation, 19 CARDOZo L. REV. 1541, 1583 (1998) (observing that one-sided proffer letters give
defendants "the ability to guarantee the delivery of the quality" of the information offered).
258 See Benjamin A. Naftalis, "Queen for a Day"Agreements and the Proper Scope ofPermissible
Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. I, 13 (20o3) (noting that
the ability of a defendant to secure leniency from the government results is a "race ... to the swift").
259 See Victoria F. Nourse,A Tale ofoTwo Lochners: The Untold History ofSubstantive Due Pro-
cess and the Idea ofFundamentalRights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009).
260 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
261 Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
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bring a case in which the defendant's factual innocence was "established." For
those cases in which the prosecution was not in possession of such evidence
(hopefully this is true for all the cases on a prosecutor's docket) Ruiz permits
prosecutors to essentially eliminate the role of defense counsel that Brady and
Alford regarded as crucial to a legitimate plea process. Without information
about the weaknesses in the prosecution's case, defense counsel is not able to
meaningfully assist his client in evaluating the likelihood of conviction because
he has no way of knowing whether the deal is a good one or not. The Court has
deferred to prosecutors to determine how much they will allow defense lawyers
to be part of the process the state set in motion.
D. Potentialfor Soft Regulation of the Plea Bargaining Process
At present, prosecutors hold all of the cards in criminal negotiations, which
Professor Stuntz describes as contrary to American constitutional norms and
inconsistent with the rule of law.262 Lafler and Frye offer the potential for soft-
regulation of the plea bargaining process, or stated another way, create the
potential for defense lawyers to hold a card or two as well. By encouraging
courts to generate norms of prosecutorial discretion, they put pressure on
prosecutors to comply with advisory guidelines. In invigorating the defense bar
to concern itself with negotiation, the Court has created conditions that may
allow defense counsel to better arm themselves for settlement conferences with
prosecutors.
Negotiation scholars instruct parties to seek agreement on standards of
legitimacy and sources that provide fair standards for valuation.263 In criminal
law, the only such sources are statutes identifying maximum penalties and
sentencing guidelines instructing judges once a defendant has been convicted
of the offense. As Stephanos Bibas has observed, however, these values are the
sticker prices for criminal conduct, not the deal that most defendants receive
when they enter into agreements to plead guilty.2" Laler and Frye, however,
invite courts finding ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining
phase to fashion sentences on the basis of fairness, which, as illustrated above,
is to ask which part of the plea offer, which led to the sentence, was motivated
by equitable concerns as opposed to quid pro quo exchanges. Such decisions by
courts would provide non-binding guidelines for prosecutors as to how they
factor fairness and leniency into their negotiations with defendants.
As described above, courts would not be required to delve into considerations
ofthe appropriate amount of leniency attributable to every possible prosecutorial
motive to determine what remedy a defendant should receive. A variety of
262 See Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra note 8, at 21.
263 See Patton, supra note 36, at 281.
264 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Con-
sumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (20II), quoted in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,1376,
1387 (2012) (dictum).
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considerations animate a prosecutor's decision to enter into a plea agreement.
Equity is only one of those considerations. As described in more detail above,
risk of acquittal, preservation of limited resources, emotional toll on victims
and witnesses, and cooperation may all explain a prosecutor's willingness to
make a deal. Courts accepting the Lafler and Frye invitation to craft remedies
that reflect fair outcomes will only be required to identify the portion of the
plea motivated by equitable considerations, as opposed to the portion solely
motivated by quid pro quo exchanges that are no longer possible and would
represent a windfall to the defendant, rather than a punishment calibrated to
his degree of culpability. Consequently, courts will, at most, be identifying how
reasonable prosecutors ought to consider equitable factors when making plea
offers.
In assessing how a reasonable prosecutor would view the equities in a
particular case, however, courts will be providing guidance to prosecutors
where guidance is the most necessary. Prosecutors are the least well equipped
to consider equitable factors-the circumstances of the particular offense and
the defendant's unique background. As advocates, they are well equipped to
understand the weaknesses in their cases. As law enforcement officers, they
understand the value of information, testimony, or other assistance a cooperating
defendant may be willing to offer. As administrators, they are certainly able to
appreciate the resources required to conduct a jury trial. The values prosecutors
place on these quid pro quo exchanges, though unregulated like all prosecutorial
offers of leniency, do not raise the same concern of under-valuation that the
consideration of equities raises.
This is not to say that plea offers on the basis of these quid pro quo
considerations are currently without problems. Critics of plea bargaining
frequently object to the weakness in the evidence as a basis for leniency.265 hey
rightly note that such offers place great pressure on defendants to forego an
opportunity to demonstrate their innocence and leave the public unsure of
the guilt of the person punished and the innocence of persons, known and
unknown, who have gone unpunished. 266 A trial ofJames Earl Ray, for instance,
may have dispensed with a number of conspiracy theories that followed the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as assured the public of Ray's
guilt despite his later protests that he pleaded guilty to avoid the electric chair.2 67
Sometimes leniency offered in the face of weak evidence raises very substantial
concerns about the innocence of a suspect who was made "an offer too good
to refuse" in light of the threat of very serious punishment. Chinese scientist
Wen Ho Lee, who was being held on espionage charges that would have led to
incarceration for his natural life, accepted a plea to a felony charge that allowed
265 See Schulhofer, supra note 56, at 1984, oo8.
266 Id. at 1996.
267 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 67I,
675 n.16 (2009) (observing that Martin Luther King's son visited James Earl Ray and expressed his
belief in Ray's innocence).
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him to be released on time served.268 Lee's case, in particular, raises this concern
because the conditions of his pre-trial confinement were so onerous as to have
prompted a civil rights action-with the blessing of the trial judge who oversaw
his criminal case-after his release.2 69
The problem with these results is that they were the product of offers of
leniency, not the result of a judicial determination of guilt. The problem is not
that the prosecution has assigned a low value to the possibility of innocence
when making that plea offer.270 Ultimately, prosecutors are analyzing their own
cases as litigators when they decide whether a plea offer should be made to
avoid an acquittal. There are certainly advocates for eliminating plea bargaining
who forcefilly object to the burden it places on potentially innocent defendants
to concede guilt and accept punishment.27 1 There is also a tension between
the judicial and advocate aspects of the prosecutor's role when considering
the possibility of innocence. It is, however, very much the task of an advocate
to consider the weakness in his case and determine the point at which his
adversary will settle. If reduced penalties are an acceptable way for the criminal
justice system to deal with weaknesses in evidence, prosecutors are probably as
able as any actor in the system to determine what offer should be made to the
defendant so that defendant will abandon his right to trial.
Prosecutors, however, can likely be trusted to deal fairly-perhaps even too
mercifully from the public's perspective-when cooperation serves as the basis
for a lenient plea offer. This may well seem ironic given the current practice of
prosecutors not to make express offers to defendants before the defendants
agree to provide information, act as undercover agents, or testify against co-
conspirators. 272 However, juries are likely suspicious of essentially purchased
testimony.273 Prosecutors therefore frequently agree only to consider immunity
for the cooperating witness in a deal that is offered as a result of the cooperator's
268 See Matthew Purdy, The Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
zoo'), http://www.nytimes.com/2oodLo2/05/us/the-prosecution-unravels-the-case-of-wen-ho-
lee.html; see also Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho
Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1693 (2000).
269 See Thomas W Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference and the Con-
struction of Race Before andAfter September 1r, 34 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 1,5-8 (2002).
270 See generally Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 73 (2009).
271 See Schulhofer, supra note 56, at 2004.
272 The dangers posed to cooperating witnesses have long been recognized. See, e.g., Graham
Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 4s VAND. L. REV. I, 7-12 (1992); Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over
Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 235-39 (1997); Richman, supra note 51,
at 94-102.
273 See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias and Context, 29 CARDOzo L. REV.
2557, 2573-74 (2008) (observing that the viewjurors tend to have about the reliability of cooperators'
testimony is completely unknown, but so is the rate at which cooperators lie).
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assistance or testimony against some third party.274 Although the prosecutor is
in the best position to know how much the cooperator has assisted the case, he
is making that determination after the cooperator has nothing more to offer
and has handed the prosecution all the evidence needed to convict. Allowing
the prosecution to determine the amount of the reduction appropriate for
cooperation seems like allowing the foxes to guard the hen house.
It turns out, however, that prosecutors offer more leniency in plea offers
for cooperation than they do for virtually any other basis.2 75 A prosecutor's
institutional role makes him most interested in solving crimes and obtaining
convictions. While prosecutors have a quasi-judicial role, at the end of the day,
prosecutors are law enforcement officers. This would explain why a prosecutor
would make a relatively generous offer to obtain information but would not
explain why he would be so generous once he obtained the information. It
must be remembered that prosecutors are repeat players and so are the defense
lawyers who represent clients with helpful information. Prosecutors who get
reputations for making stingy offers after receiving substantial assistance are
likely to encounter defendants willing to take their chances at trial. There is no
active market for a snitch's information in the sense that competing prosecutors
are offering different amounts of leniency, but there is a sort of market check on
the prosecutor's pricing of information.
However, a prosecutor's exercise of equitable discretion involves an inherent
conflict of interest. The advocacy half of the advocate-jurist role naturally leads
a prosecutor to minimize the circumstances unique to the defendant's case that
would suggest he should be treated leniently. Prosecutors consider the evidence
presented to them by beat officers and detectives. They meet with victims or,
in very serious cases, the families of victims. They come to understand how
crime in general, and certainly the crime they are currently prosecuting, caused
injury to real human beings. They do not meet with the defendant except with
his attorney for the purpose of discussing a deal. For obvious reasons, the
sympathetic factors about the defendant only appear on the prosecutor's radar
in the bargaining process. As prosecutors prepare their cases for a potential
trial, they consider how to introduce those facts that will make jurors dislike the
defendant and how to minimize the impact of evidence that might make the
defendant seem sympathetic. As courts crafting remedies consider how much
leniency should have been attributed to concepts of fairness in particular cases,
they add balance to the conversation. From a more objective viewpoint, judges
are less likely to minimize equitable considerations.
If defense lawyers are able to approach negotiations with information
about deals other lawyers have received and guidance from courts about the
appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the negotiation process will
274 See Eric Rasmusen, Mezzanatto and the Economics of Self-Crimination, 19 CARDOzo L.
REV. 1541, 1552 (1998).
275 See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56
VAND. L. REV. I, 12-13, 21 (2003) (describing federal practice with cooperating witnesses).
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fundamentally change. Soft-regulation by the judiciary would impose legal
norms into the discussion and the process of negotiation would be much
more of a give-and-take. By creating the possibility of greater substantive and
procedural protections for defendants, these decisions have the potential to
begin plea bargaining's journey, from an essentially lawless regime toward a
common law of plea bargaining.
CONCLUSION
The Court's long-standing respect for separation of powers-or more
precisely, the prosecutorial prerogative-prevented direct judicial limits on
America's unregulated inquisitorial system of criminal justice: plea bargaining.
Lafter and Frye have created the circumstances that may allow courts and
defense lawyers to have influence over a world previously dominated by
unchecked agents of the executive branch.
